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IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH OFFSHORE OiL LAW
In many ways the development of the United Kingdom oil industry
has followed different lines from its United States counterpart. During
the first half of this century the United Kingdom produced virtually no
indigenous hydrocarbons. However, this does not mean to say that there
had not been a British oil industry during that time. The Middle East
was a sphere of British influence from roughly the beginning of the cen-
tury to the 1950's, and the British were the prime movers in the explora-
tion and development of that region's tremendous reserves.49 Indeed,
the history of the British Petroleum Company Limited (BP) can be
traced to the granting of the 1901 D'Arcy concession agreement,499
which heralded the beginning of the Iranian oil industry.
As the First World War ominously approached, and as the oil-based
fuel needs of the Royal Navy became more readily apparent, the British
government began to take steps to ensure that the United Kingdom
would have some national control over its oil supply. In 1911, the gov-
ernment obtained a large shareholding in BP and, consequently, acquired
the power to elect directors who could veto any corporate decision."
While this veto power has never been implemented,"0' the idea of govern-
ment acquiring an operational stake in the exploration of oil and gas
would eventually prove to be an important precedent for the United
Kingdom and many other oil-producing countries. The coming of the
First World War also provided the first real impetus for exploration in
the British Isles themselves.5 "2 Beginning with the passage of the Petro-
leum (Production) Act 0 3 in 1918, no one could explore for or produce
petroleum in the United Kingdom without a government licence.504 The
Act was designed to avoid the wasteful drilling which had occurred in
498. See T. DAn;rrH & G. WILLOUGHBY, A MANUAL OF UNrrED KINGDOm OIL AND GAS
LAW 10 (1977).
499. Ely & Pietrowski, Changing Concepts in the World's Mineral and Petroleum Development
Laws, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 9, 22.
500. T. DAnTITH & G. WmLOUGHY, supra note 498, at 10-11.
501. Id. at 10.
502. Id. at 11.
503. Petroleum (Production) Act, 1918, 8 & 9 Geo. 5, ch. 52.
504. Id. §§ 1, 2.
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contemporary American onshore fields.50 5 Under the authority of this
legislation, the government hired an oil company, S. Pearson and Sons
Limited, to do exploratory work in various parts of the country. But
results were unencouraging, and aspirations for a domestic oil supply
were put to rest for about fifteen years.50 6
In 1934, the government reviewed the possibility of onshore explora-
tion and found that one of the reasons why progress had been so slow
was that operators were not sure whether the rule of capture was the law
in the three British legal systems.50 7 The Petroleum (Production) Act
1934508 (PPA) resolved this perceived difficulty by providing that all pe-
troleum deposits in Britain were to be henceforth owned by the
Crown. 0 9 The PPA also provided for oil and gas licensing 10 and is cur-
rently the legislative basis for the granting of all United Kingdom oil and
gas licences. 5  In 1964, the PPA was extended to apply to the UKCS.512
Like the Secretary of the Interior in the United States,5" 3 the British
Secretary of Energy has discretion to award licences to the applicant
whom he feels is most suitable. Unlike the OCSLA or the OCSLAA, the
PPA does not provide for specific bidding systems which must be used
when licensing. The only direction given to the Secretary with respect to
the issuance of licences appears in section 6 of the PPA.5 14 Given this
skeletal statutory framework for oil and gas development, the PPA obvi-
505. See T. DAn4TrrH & G. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 498, at 11.
506. Id.
507. Id. at 11-12. The United Kingdom is composed of four nations: Scotland, Northern Ire-
land, England, and Wales. But there are three legal systems: Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Eng-
land and Wales.
508. Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, ch. 36.
509. Id. § I(I).
510. The PPA provides:
(1) The Board of Trade [currently, the Secretary of State], on behalf of His Majesty, shall
have power to grant to such persons as they [he] think[s] fit licences to search and bore for
and get petroleum.
(2) Any such licence shall be granted for such consideration (whether by way of royalty
or otherwise) as the Board of Trade with the consent of the Treasury may determine, and
upon such other terms and conditions as the Board of Trade think[s] fit.
Id. § 2(1), (2).
511. The PPA does not cover Northern Ireland. Id. § 11(3).
512. Continental Shelf Act, 1964, ch. 29, § 1(3).
513. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) (1982).
514. Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Gee. 5, ch. 36, § 6(1). Section 6(1) provides:
The Board of Trade [Secretary of State] shall, before granting any licence under this Act,
make regulations prescribing-
(a) the manner in which and the persons by whom applications for licences under this
Act may be made;
(b) the fees to be paid on any such application;
(c) the conditions as to the size and shape of areas in respect of which licences may be
granted
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ously envisaged that United Kingdom oil and gas law would be almost
wholly the product of regulations. There is nothing in the British oil
regime comparable to the exhaustively intricate, pyramidic structure of
American OCS legislation. Not only is the OCSLA much more complex
than the PPA, the whole body of the latter is smaller than many sections
of the OCSLAA. In addition, the PPA, which confiscated private min-
eral rights without compensation, exemplifies the notion that there is no
constitutional constraint on the actions of the British Parliament. 15 The
fact that Parliament is unfettered by a written constitution means that its
capacity as a regulator is much less inhibited than is the case in the
United States. In sum, the PPA grants maximum discretion to the Brit-
ish government.
The PPA was confined in effect to "Great Britain,"516 an area usu-
ally taken to refer to the Island of Great Britain and offshore Scottish,
English, and Welsh islands. This area does not normally include North-
ern Ireland or the three-mile territorial sea." 7 While Northern Ireland
was made subject to similar provisions pursuant to the Petroleum (Pro-
duction) Act (Northern Ireland),5" 8 the position of the territorial sea was
unclear till very recently. Despite the doubts of some commentators," 9
the government believed that the PPA vested the Crown with the oil and
gas rights in the territorial sea. This issue gave rise to virtually the only
instance of United Kingdom oil and gas litigation, the case of Earl of
Lonsdale v. Attorney General.20 The dispute in Earl of Lonsdale cen-
tered around the construction and effect of a Crown grant of "mineral
substances" made in 1880 and its relation to the seabed and subsoil of a
part of the territorial sea off the Cumberland coast in northern Eng-
land."1 In 1973, the Earl of Lonsdale, a descendant of the original
grantee, sued the Crown for a declaration that he owned the oil and gas
covered by the 1880 grant. Counsel for the Crown advanced a twofold
defense: (1) references to minerals in the 1880 grant did not include oil
(d) model clauses which shall, unless the Board of Trade think[s] fit to modify or exclude
them in any particular case, be incorporated in any such licence.
Id.
515. Daintith, The Petroleum Production License in the United Kingdom, in THE LEGAL CHAR-
ACTER OF PETROLEUM LICENSES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 206-07 (T. Daintith ed. 1981).
516. See Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, ch. 36, § 1(1).
517. See Daintith, supra note 515, at 202-03.
518. Petroleum (Production) Act (Northern Ireland), 1964.
519. See Daintith, supra note 515, at 202-03.
520. [1982] 3 All E.R. 579 (Ch.).
521. In Scotland it seems as if the Crown owns the minerals of the territorial sea at common law.
See Crown Estate Commissioners v. Fairlie Yacht Club, [1977] S.L.T. 19.
1985]
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and gas and (2) even if the 1880 grant did include oil and gas, the PPA
and the Continental Shelf Act 1964 effectively extinguished all such pri-
vate rights.5 2
2
The Crown won its case on the first argument as Judge Slade held
that the grant had never anticipated oil and gas workings.5 2 3 In discuss-
ing the Crown's second ground of defense, however, Judge Slade noted
that the words "Great Britain" as used in the PPA were ambiguous. 524
If the Crown was right, Judge Slade observed, the PPA would allow for a
taking without compensation of private oil and gas rights in the territo-
rial sea.5 25  While this type of taking was within Parliament's power,
statutes providing for such power had to be written expressly and unam-
biguously to be effective.5 26 Accordingly, Judge Slade concluded that the
appropriation provisions of the PPA did not apply to the territorial
sea.
527
Because a ruling on the applicability of the PPA to the territorial sea
was not necessary to decide Earl of Lonsdale, the British government
could have dismissed Judge Slade's opinion as mere obiter dicta. How-
ever, at about the time that judgment was rendered, a new offshore oil
provision, the Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Bill, was being debated in the
House of Lords. Seizing upon the opportunity to eliminate the possibil-
ity of any future litigation over the issue, the Scottish Lord Advocate
successfully proposed an amendment to the PPA which retroactively
vested the Crown with the ownership of petroleum underlying the terri-
torial sea.5 28
The United Kingdom ratified the Geneva Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf in 1964.529 The Continental Shelf Act 1964530 vested Her
Majesty with the United Kingdom's rights in the minerals of the
522. [1982] 3 All E.R. at 582.
523. Id. at 613-16.
524. Id. at 625.
525. Id. at 619.
526. Id.
527. Id. at 626.
528. Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act, 1982, ch. 23, § 18(1).
529. The exact date of ratification was May 11, 1964. See Young, Offshore Claims and Problems
in the North Sea, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 505, 509 (1965). For several discussions on the apportionment
of the North Sea Continental Shelf amongst the various European states which it borders, see Dam,
Oil and Gas Licensing and the North Sea, 8 J.L. & ECON. 51 (1965); Morris, Oil and Gas Legal
Problems on the North Sea Continental Shelf, 7 WAsHBuRN L.J. 245 (1968); Utton, Institutional
Arrangements for Developing North Sea Oil and Gas, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 66, 68-76 (1968); Young,
supra, at 509.
530. Continental Shelf Act, 1964, ch. 29.
[Vol. 21:225
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UKCS 3 1 and provided that the extent of the UKCS was to be deter-
mined by Order in Council.532 The parts of the ocean floor claimed as
the UKCS are referred to as "designated areas."s' There have been a
number of Orders of Council defining and expanding the UKCS. The
present extent of the latter is about 651,650 square kilometers, 34 roughly
one-eighth of the size of the American OCS. Most importantly, section
1(3) of the Continental Shelf Act extends the effect of sections 2 and 6 of
the PPA to the UKCS, thereby allowing for the discretionary onshore
licensing system to be repeated in the vastly more lucrative offshore
areas.
535
Finally, it should be noted that there are three legal systems in the
United Kingdom.536 The criminal law of all three systems concurrently
governs acts or omissions on, above, or below, or in waters within 500
meters of, installations in the UKCS. 37 So, if an act taking place on an
oil rig in the UKCS off southern England is an offense according to the
law of Scotland, Scottish courts can try the offense as if it had occurred
in Scotland. For purposes of civil acts or omissions relating to mineral
activity, the UKCS is apportioned by Order in Council between the three
legal systems. 38 Most of the UKCS falls under the Scottish sector.
A. The Early Stages of North Sea Development
Despite the changes made by the PPA, very little exploration was
undertaken in the British Isles during the thirty years between 1934 and
1964. Indigenous British production in that period amounted to about
0.1% of annual consumption. 39 But in 1959, a huge gas reservoir was
found in Groningen in the Netherlands. Because Holland is part of a
sedimentary basin which extends to Denmark, West Germany, and a
large section of the North Sea, it became plain to geologists that hydro-
carbons might also be found under the North Sea.5 4° When faced with
531. Id. § 1(1). The Act did not include coal. Id.
532. Id. § 1(7).
533. Id.
534. U. K. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DEVELOPMENT OF THE OIL AND GAs RESOURCES OF THE
UNrIED KINGDOM 1983, at 9 (1983).
535. See Continental Shelf Act, 1964, ch. 29, § 1(3).
536. See supra note 507.
537. Continental Shelf Act, 1964, ch. 29, § 3(1), amended by Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act,
1982, ch. 23, § 22(1).
538. Continental Shelf Act, 1964, ch. 29, § 3(2), amended by Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act,
1982, ch. 23, § 23(1).
539. Milner, Petroleum Legislation and Licensing Procedures in the North Sea and Some Associ-
ated International Problems, 18 NAT. REsOURCES J. 545, 545 (1978).
540. See id. at 545-46.
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this possibility, British governments of the 1960's, Conservative and La-
bour, pursued three main goals with respect to the North Sea's unfolding
potential: (1) thoroughly explore the UKCS as fast as possible; (2) secure
maximum British involvement in that exploration; and (3) obtain a useful
additional flow of revenues. 41 Realising that the state had neither the
necessary funds or expertise for the task, the British government found
itself forced to rely on private oil companies. While it was hoped that
British corporations would become heavily involved in the exploration
and development of the North Sea, it was also clear that the participation
of the American multinational oil corporations would also be
required.5 42
The first important step that the government took towards the real-
isation of its goals was to set up a legal basis for offshore mineral ex-
ploitation with the passage of the Continental Shelf Act 1964.
Thereafter, the Ministry of Power embarked on the creation of a substan-
tive offshore oil and gas regime by drafting pertinent regulations and by
administrative fiat. The final product reflected the government's goals
and very closely resembled the previous provisions applying to onshore
exploration and production. 43 Many of the salient features of this initial
system, particularly the allocation of the UKCS into licensing blocks, the
exploration and production licences, and the method of licensing itself,
have remained substantially unchanged up until the present.
Offshore areas were divided into blocks averaging about 250 square
kilometers or approximately 100 square miles." 4 The government's in-
tention was to offer many of these blocks simultaneously in licensing
rounds. According to some commentators, the blocks were made small
to encourage more offers and hence to involve more British companies in
the licensing process. 54 While some have argued that the British blocks
are too small, it should be noted that they are normally about ten times
541. P. CAMERON, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SOVEREIGN RIGHTS: THE CASE OF NoRTH SEA
OIL 76 (1983).
542. See K. DAM, OiL RESOuRCES: WHO GETS WHAT How? 24-25 (1976).
543. See Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1966 STAT. INsT. No. 898; Petroleum (Produc-
tion) (Continental Shelf and Territorial Sea) Regulations, 1964 STAT. INST. No. 708. For a discus-
sion of the similarity between these largely identical regulations and earlier regulations governing
onshore exploration and development of oil and gas, see P. CAMERON, supra note 541, at 74.
544. See Dam, supra note 529, at 55.
545. See Millard, The Legal Environment of the British Oil Industry, 18 TULSA L.J. 394, 414-15
(1983). Apparently, the major American oil companies wanted larger blocks. See P. CAMERON,
supra note 541, at 77.
[Vol. 21:225
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larger than American OCS tracts.5" It is for this reason that proponents
of expedited OCS leasing in the United States hold the UKCS system up
as an example of areawide leasing.54 7 Indeed, the block method has
opened up large areas of the UKCS to exploration. For example, in just
the fourth round of licensing, held in 1971-72, 282 blocks comprising an
area of roughly eighteen million acres were licenced.5 "1 As late as Au-
gust 1983, by comparison, only about thirty million acres had ever been
leased in the American OCS 49 But despite the size of the British
blocks, much of the UKCS, especially the deepwater Northwestern, At-
lantic, and Southwestern Regions, is still unexplored frontier territory.
Almost all of the initial licensing and all of the initial development took
place in the North Sea.
1. The Licensing System
A company may apply for two types of offshore licences: the explo-
ration licence and the production licence. The exploration licence allows
the licensee, upon payment of a fixed fee, to conduct geological and geo-
physical exploration anywhere in territorial waters or on the UKCS, ex-
cept in an area which is allocated to a production licence.550 Because it
provides only for the right to explore, the exploration licence is directly
equivalent to the American preliminary exploration permit.5 5 ' The ex-
ploration licence allows exploratory drilling to a depth of 350 meters.55 2
Oil wells drilled pursuant to an exploration licence must be approved by
the Minister of Energy. 53 The term for an exploration licence is three
years, but it is possible to request an extension for a further three
years.55 4 Anyone can apply for an exploration licence at any time as they
are not offered on the basis of "rounds."
The production licence is the only legal means for any person other
546. One hundred square miles equals 64,000 acres. American OCS tracts are normally 5760
acres or larger if the Secretary of the Interior so determines. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1982).
547. See AM. PET. INST., THE SEARCH FOR OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS: SETING THE RECORD
STRAiGHT (1984).
548. U. K. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 534, at 32.
549. See MINERALS MGMT. SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL OFFSHORE STA-
TiSTICS 16 (1984).
550. See Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1982 STAT. INST. No. 1000, Reg. 8 & sched. 7.
The law relating to exploration licences, production licences, and the licensing process in general has
remained essentially the same since the inception of the British offshore legal regime. Accordingly,
references will be made to regulations presently in force.
551. See 43 U.S.C. § 1340(a)(1) (1982).
552. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1982 STAT. INST. No. 1000, sched. 7, cl. 3.
553. Id. at cl. 7.
554. Id. at el. 4.
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than the Crown to produce petroleum in United Kingdom territorial wa-
ters or on the UKCS. As noted previously, production licences are
granted with respect to 250 square kilometer blocks and pursuant to li-
censing rounds. Production licences constitute a grant of proprietary
concession by the Crown and are, for most purposes, similar to an Amer-
ican OCS lease. One major difference, however, lies in the fact that the
British government may unilaterally vary the terms of a production li-
cence, whereas the United States government is constrained in this re-
spect by the Constitution.55
The British selected at the outset and have, with some exceptions,
continued to utilise what has been termed by Dam as the "discretionary
allocation system" of licensing. 5 6 The principal feature of this system is
that it allows the government to select applicants for licences on the basis
of the applicant's ability to meet national goals. The government begins
the process by announcing its intention to hold a licensing round in the
London, Edinburgh, and Belfast Gazettes and including in this notice a
list of blocks for which applications are invited and a closing date for
their receipt.5 57 Also included in the Gazette notice is a list of criteria
which the government will use in the selection of applicants. In the first
round, held in 1964, there were five criteria:
[F]irst, the need to encourage the most rapid and thorough exploration
and economical exploitation of petroleum resources in the Continental
Shelf. Second, the requirement that the applicant for a licence shall be
incorporated in the United Kingdom and the profits of the operations
shall be taxable here. Thirdly, in cases where the applicant is a for-
eign-owned concern, how far British oil companies receive equitable
treatment in that country. Fourthly... the programme of work of the
applicant and also . . . the ability and resources to implement it.
Fifthly... the contribution the applicant has already made and is
making towards the development of resources for our Continental
Shelf and the development of [the British] fuel economy generally. 5 '
The licensing criteria have varied from round to round because of the
changing political colors of the governments and because of economic
circumstances. Nevertheless, every government has used its discretion to
attempt to obtain the maximum benefit for the British economy and
Exchequer.
Part of the consideration given for a licence, which may be issued
555. See Daintith, supra note 515, at 206-07.
556. See generally K. DAM, supra note 542, at 3-11 (discussing the reasons for a licensing
system).
557. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1982 STAT. INST. No. 1000, Reg. 7.
558. 692 PARL DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 897 (1964).
[Vol. 21:225
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with respect to more than one block, has always involved a royalty of
about 12.5%, as well as a small fixed fee 5 9 Given this relatively small
source of income, the British government has consistently relied on taxa-
tion as the main guarantor of the United Kingdom's economic rent ac-
cruing from oil and gas activity. In this respect it is different from the
United States, which relies mainly on bonus payments and royalties.
The main competitive aspect of the licensing system has been the
required submission of a work programme, 6 ° which is the closest thing
to a British bid variable. The work programme, although a significant
aspect of the licensing system, is not directly equivalent to an American
bid variable because it is only one of several wide ranging factors used in
determining the issuance of a licence. In the United Kingdom, the other
factors encompass a much wider scope than the mere technical and fi-
nancial competence of the applicant, as they take into account the whole
range of national desiderata defined in the Gazette notice.
The applications procedure is also somewhat different from the
American model. In the United States, bids are submitted for, and are
opened on, a certain date. It is then up to the DOI to announce awards
after tract evaluation has been completed. While applications are also
returned pursuant to a closing date in the United Kingdom, the process
continues with a period of further negotiation with the Department of
Energy on the subject of exploration programmes and other issues.5 6 1
Only then will licences be awarded. Tract evaluation is undertaken in-
formally at the discretion of the Department of Energy.
2. Model Clauses
At first glance, the Reagan administration's objectives for OCS de-
velopment-encouraging exploration and stimulating the economy-ap-
pear to be similar to the goals adopted by the British government for the
UKCS in 1964. But the Reagan administration has adopted a very com-
petitive and market-oriented mode of offshore leasing and has rejected
the work commitment method of bidding which, in a modified version,
forms the basis of the British system. A number of factors have ac-
counted for this difference in approach. On the American side, the initial
premise of the Reagan administration's offshore policy is that the oil cor-
559. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1982 STAT. INST. No. 1000, Reg. 11 & sched. 5, cls.
7-10.
560. See generally Dam, supra note 529, at 59-60 (discussing the merits of the work programme
system).
561. See P. CAMERON, supra note 541, at 78.
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porations are ready and willing to explore and develop the OCS. The
Department of the Interior has had extensive experience in dealing with
oil companies for at least a century. Moreover, the United States is the
home base for a large majority of the world's major oil companies and
consumes more oil than any other nation on earth. 62 The United States
is also the world leader in offshore hydrocarbon technology. In this con-
text, it is quite plausible to conclude that it will be the American oil
industry, American energy security, and the wider American economy
which will benefit most from a competitive and aggressive OCS leasing
policy.
In contrast, in the early and mid-1960's the British government
faced a quite different situation. The extent of interest that oil companies
would show for North Sea exploration was uncertain. In addition, no
one had any real idea of the region's potential. The only certain thing
was that it would be one of the most difficult areas in the world to ex-
ploit, a point which the oil companies were quick to emphasise.163 It was
feared that if the bonus system of bidding was used, the bids would be
small and concentrated only in the most lucrative areas. 64 It was also
felt that American-style competitive leasing would enable the multina-
tional oil corporations to use their vast capital to outbid the smaller Brit-
ish corporations.161 On the other hand, it was recognized that the
imposition of harsh leasing conditions biased in favor of British corpora-
tions might result in prejudice towards British companies located over-
seas. In light of these adverse possibilities, the discretionary system
became an increasingly popular alternative. The Conservatives in partic-
ular saw the discretionary system as a means of attracting necessary for-
eign capital and expertise with easy terms. Moreover, the discretionary
system allowed the government to insist on exploration and to induce
foreign oil companies to collaborate with their British counterparts and
buy British goods.5 66
The British eventually chose to regulate the offshore oil industry
solely through model clauses in licences. 67 At successive times these
562. For a statistical comparison of United States oil consumption with other major Western
nations, see . GRAY, H. FOWLER, & J. HAENED, U.S. ENERGY POLICY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
IN THE 1980s, at 275 (1981).
563. See Millard, supra note 545, at 411-12.
564. Id. at 412-13.
565. P. CAMERON, supra note 541, at 56.
566. Cameron goes so far as to remark that "the objective of securing [economic] rent at this
stage took second place to the two other objectives: promoting the interests of specifically British
companies, and securing an intensive programme of exploration." Id. at 79.
567. See T. DAIN=rrrr & G. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 498, at 12.
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clauses have been laid down in both statutes and regulations. Although
they are not technically effective until the Secretary of Energy includes
them in any given licence, it has been consistently provided that model
clauses are to be made a part of each licence unless the Secretary deter-
mines otherwise, 68 thus giving them a form of presumptive validity.
Perhaps the closest American parallel is the lease stipulation, which var-
ies from lease sale to lease sale and from tract to tract and which is cre-
ated purely by administrative fiat.569
The model clauses remained very similar throughout the first four
rounds of licensing. 7 0 The only significant change that a period of La-
bour government (1964-1970) brought was that Gazette notices for the
second (1965) and third (1969) rounds allowed for the participation of
nationalised industries in the licensing process. The result was that the
British Gas Corporation (BGC) and the National Coal Board (NCB) ob-
tained an entry into the new offshore business.57 1
The model clauses remained the only regulatory system of control
that the British government had over the UKCS till 1971 and the passing
of the Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act. 72 In a basically
underregulated industry, the model clauses, which under their own terms
allowed for no renegotiation, were undoubtedly favorable to the oil com-
panies. For example, the initial term for a licence was six years;573 upon
the elapse of such time the licensee could choose to retain up to half its
acreage for a further forty years.5 74 This right was not dependent on the
licensee performing its work programme.17 5 A single model clause gov-
erned the drilling of wells and the development of reservoirs.576 Royalty
was fixed at 12.5% and North Sea revenues were taxed until 1974 on the
basis of ordinary corporate earnings.57 7 Coupled with the easy availabil-
568. See Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1982 STAT. INST. No. 1000, Reg. 3(1).
569. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1982); 30 C.F.R. § 256.29 (1983).
570. See Millard, supra note 545, at 421.
571. For a further analysis of early state involvement in UKCS oil operations, see P. CAMERON,
supra note 541, at 80-85.
572. Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act, 1971, ch. 61. See generally Donelan, Off-
shore Exploration and Exploitation: The Legal Regimes of the United Kingdom and the Republic of
Ireland, 133 NEw LJ. 461 (1983) (describing the Act's main provisions, which largely relate to the
management of oil rigs).
573. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1966 STAT. INST. No. 898, sched. 4, cl. 3.
574. Id. at sched. 4, cl. 5.
575. Id. at sched. 4, cl. 4. It is interesting to note that in 1980 Professor Odell claimed that 38
exploration wells agreed to in work programmes from the fourth round had never been drilled. See
P. CAMERON, supra note 541, at 161.
576. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1966 STAT. INST. No. 898, sched. 4, cl. 13.
577. See P. CAmERON, supra note 541, at 79.
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ity of acreage, the model clauses encouraged exploration and develop-
ment as the oil-bearing potential of the northern sector of the UKCS was
unveiled.
Some of the model clauses were used to effect the government's goal
of securing a large part of the benefits derived from the oil for Britain.
All oil and gas taken from the UKCS and territorial sea had (and still
has) to be landed in the United Kingdom." 8 Up until 1975, permission
was needed for the export of such petroleum.17 9 And, until 1976, only
British persons could apply for production licences, a provision which
necessitated the formation of British subsidiaries by the major multina-
tional oil corporations.5 80 It was hoped that these clauses might help to
spur the expansion of a domestic oil production and refining industry.
B. The Changes of the Early 1970s
The eight years from 1964 to 1972 marked a transformation in the
status of the North Sea as the area developed into a proven hydrocarbon
province. The four licensing rounds held in those years involved the li-
censing of offshore acreage larger in total size than England and Wales
combined."8 ' Included in these rounds were many of the most prospec-
tive blocks in the UKCS.1 2 Oil was discovered in large quantities in the
UKCS as early as June 1970, and immense strikes followed soon after.5 83
In fact, the average size of a find in 1970 was a massive 900 to 1000
million barrels. 84 Wells in the Forties field, discovered in that year, each
produced an average of ten thousand barrels per day.585 In contrast, a
Gulf of Mexico well which produces in excess of one thousand barrels
per day is considered good. 86 North Sea wildcatting has had a one in
four success rate, which is much higher than in many other of the
578. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1966 STAT. INsr. No. 898, sched. 4, cl. 21 (reenacted
in Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1982 STAT. INST. No. 1000, sched. 5, ci. 27).
579. The necessity for permission to export domestically produced petroleum was lifted by the
Export of Goods (Control) (Amendment) Order, 1975 STAT. INST. No. 149.
580. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1966 STAT. INST. No. 898, Reg. 4. This provision
was later changed so that "any person may apply." Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1982
STAT. INST. No. 1000, Reg. 4.
581. Daintith & Gault, Pacta Sunt Servanda and the Licensing and Taxation of North Sea Oil
Production, 8 CAMBRIAN L. REv. 27, 33 (1977).
582. See P. CAMERON, supra note 541, at 89.
583. The 1969 discovery of oil in the Ekofisk field in the Norwegian Continental Shelf erased the
earlier belief that natural gas alone would constitute the valuable reserves in the North Sea. See Id.
at 87.
584. Shell U.K. Ltd., Depletion Policy in the UK: A Discussion Paper (August 1980) (chart 1).








All told, the North Sea has been the fastest developed part of the
world's hydrocarbon-bearing continental shelf.5 88 It would be erroneous
to assume, however, that the only reason for this development was the
region's physical potential. A number of other factors played a signifi-
cant role in the rapid exploitation of United Kingdom offshore oil. The
British government's licensing policy, which provided for easy access to
UKCS acreage and generous licence terms, proved to be a major stimu-
lus to development. But possibly as important was the changing political
nature of the Arab oil-producing states. After the formation of OPEC,
the Middle East was increasingly regarded by the multinational oil cor-
porations as a risky theatre of operations.5 8 9 In comparison, the stormy
North Sea provided a relatively stable political zone. The North Sea was
also within very easy reach of some of the largest oil-consuming markets
in the world. 90
In the fourth round of licensing, held in 1971-72, licences were again
awarded for large amounts of acreage pursuant to the pattern used in the
1960's.591 After the size of the North Sea bonanza became apparent,
however, legislators and public opinion began to doubt the wisdom of the
contracts which had been struck during the early rounds. In 1972, the
House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, composed of Members
of Parliament (M.P.'s) of all shades of political opinion, strongly
criticised the government's North Sea oil policy and the terms under
which the oil companies were working. The First Report on North Sea
Oil and Gas highlighted the fact that the United Kingdom was getting
very little economic rent from offshore resources. 92 The report sug-
gested that taxation, the means of obtaining "fair market value," was set
at an inadequately low level. The contemporary tax law, it was claimed,
would allow oil companies to set off North Sea profitability against tax
587. ScoTrSH DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, SCoTLAND: THE OIL AND GAS FuTURE 5 (1983).
588. Id. at 8.
589. See generally Jaidah, The United States' Energy Situation: An OPEC View, 11 NAT. RE-
SOURCES LAW. 617 (1978); Mirvahabi, Claims to the Oil Resources in the Persian Gulf: Will the
World Economy Be Controlled by the Gulf in the Future? 11 TE. INT'L LJ. 75 (1976).
590. See generally D. KETO, LAW AND OFFSHORE OIL DEvELOPMENT: THE NORTH SEA Ex-
PERIENCE 1-15 (1978) (discussing the European oil market).
591. See Millard, supra note 545, at 423-25. The Conservative government did, however, use an
auction system for 15 of the 435 blocks offered. All 15 blocks were bid on, bringing the Exchequer
£37 million. See generally K. DAM, supra note 542, at 36-43 (discussing the auction experiment in
detail).
592. HOUSE OF COMMONS COMM. OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, FIRST REPORT ON NORTH SEA OIL
AND GAS, H.C. REP. No. 122, 1972-73 Sess. xxxii-xxxifil, reprinted in 19 PARLtAmENTARY PAPERS
(HousE OF COMMONS AND COMMAND) (REPORTS, ACCOUNTS AND PAPERS) 1, 32-33 (1973).
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losses made by their trading activities abroad.593 Awarding such a mas-
sive amount of highly prospective acreage on such favorable terms also
met with criticism. Much of the best of the UKCS, the Committee
found, was now held by multinational oil companies for up to forty-six
years. 94 The Committee's recommendations were largely confined to
the realm of taxation, but the main effect of the findings was to initiate a
political debate over the future of UKCS oil and gas regulation.595
No sooner had the First Report on North Sea Oil and Gas been
published, than the Yom Kippur conflagration ensued with the conse-
quent Arab oil embargo and the quadrupling of OPEC oil prices. The
crisis ended the era of cheap oil and greatly heightened public awareness
of the valuable nature of energy resources. It also caused the multina-
tional oil companies to be seen in an unfavorable light. It was felt that
these companies had taken advantage of events in the Middle East; in-
creases in the profits of Exxon by 59%, Texaco by 48%, and Mobil by
47% did little to dispel this notion.5 96 The Conservative government of
Mr. Edward Heath embarked on an early general election campaign in
the spring of 1974 amid scenes of unprecedented industrial unrest and
the imposition of a three-day working week. An important issue in the
election was the future course of British oil policy. The Conservatives
proposed an increase in taxation, but the Labour party went further, ad-
vocating much tougher governmental control over North Sea operations
and a substantial, direct state role in exploitation.597
When Labour won the elections of March and October of 1974, it
became clear that changes in the offshore oil and gas regime would be
inevitable. Before going on to evaluate the oil policy adopted by Labour,
note should be taken of a very significant development which was occur-
ring in Scotland.
1. Scottish Nationalism
To date, most of the oil found in the UKCS has been discovered in
the large Scottish sector. Scotland has for centuries been a political
enigma. In 1707, she joined with England and Wales to form the United
Kingdom. The Treaty of Union, which effectuated a merger of the Scot-
593. See Dam, The Evolution of North Sea Licensing Policy in Britain and Norway, 17 J.L. &
ECON. 213, 214 (1974).
594. See HousE oF COMMONS COMM. OF PUBLIC AccoUNITs, supra note 592, at xxix-xxx.
595. See P. CAMERON, supra note 541, at 89-90.
596. Id. at 91.
597. See Y. DAM, supra note 542, at 103-07.
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fish and English Parliaments, allowed the Scots to retain their Presbyte-
rian religion and their distinctive legal system, which is partly based on
Roman law. The Scottish educational system has also, up until the pres-
ent, been run on different lines from the English system. Perhaps most
importantly, the Scots have never lost their sense of national identity and
tend to think of themselves as a member of the world's community of
nations in their own right.59
Since 1707, Scotland has never had any form of legislative control
over her own affairs. She has none of the legislative power possessed, for
example, by a state in the United States. She currently returns seventy-
two M.P.'s to a House of Commons which has over 600 members, the
overwhelming majority of whom are English. There is a Scottish Office
in Edinburgh which has responsibility for administrative aspects of Scot-
tish matters-for example, education, fishing, and agriculture.5 99 But the
members of this Scottish Executive are chosen by a British Prime Minis-
ter who is frequently the leader of a party that is different from that
which attracts the support of the majority of Scottish voters. At various
times since the inception of the Union, Scotland has manifested discon-
tent with the British constitutional arrangement. In the post-war period,
the vehicle for this dissent has been the Scottish National Party (SNP).
The object of the SNP has been to achieve Scottish independence within
the British Commonwealth. The party has always sought to advance this
objective through the election of an SNP majority of Scottish M.P.'s.
Although SNP membership peaked at 200,000 in 1968 before the major
North Sea oil discoveries, the slogan "It's Scotland's Oil" undoubtedly
assisted the party in later gaining about a third of the Scottish vote and
obtaining the election of eleven M.P.'s in October 1974.' By 1976, na-
tionalist support had increased to the point where, had there been a gen-
eral election at any time before 1977, Scotland would probably have
returned an SNP majority."°1 Whether this would have resulted in Scot-
tish independence is a matter of conjecture. In any event, the effect of
this Scottish political atmosphere pressured both the Labour and Con-
598. See generally C. HARvi, ScoTLAND AND NATIONALISM: ScoTrIsH SoCIETY AND PoLI-
TICS (1977).
599. A good description of the history and workings of this Scottish Executive is given in D.
WALKER, THE ScoTrisH LEGAL SYSTEM 155-58 (5th ed. 1981).
600. Forster & Zillman, The British National Oil Corporation: The- State Enterprise as Instru-
ment of Energy Policy, 3 1. ENmGY L. & POL'Y 57, 102-04 (1982).
601. See Northrup, Nationalists Who Seek Independent Scotland Are Gaining Strength, Wall St.
J., Oct. 23, 1975, at 1, col. 1; see also Grant, Oil and Gas, in INDEPENDENCE AND DEVOLUnTON:
THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR ScoTLAND 86 (J. Grant ed. 1976) (projecting an independent Scot-
land's position towards North Sea oil).
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servative parties into advancing schemes for Scottish legislative devolu-
tion. °2 Scottish nationalism proved particularly discomfiting to the
Labour party, which traditionally relied on Scotland to overcome the
English dominance of the Conservative party. In fact, the Labour gov-
ernment of the 1970's had frequently depended on SNP collaboration to
allow it to continue its wafer-thin hold on power. Scottish political re-
surgence, therefore, cast a shadow over Labour's proposals for varying
the modus operandi of the North Sea.
C. Labour Policy from 1974 to 1979
The main goals of the new Socialist administration of 1974 were to
increase government control over British oil reserves and offshore activ-
ity and to obtain a more equitable economic rent from the development
of Britain's resources."° These goals were implemented by legal changes
which can be broken down into three classifications: (1) changes in oper-
ating conditions; (2) the creation of a national oil company; and (3) the
creation of a new oil taxation system.
1. Changes in Operating Conditions
Before looking at the most important substantive variations which
were introduced by the Labour government into UKCS regulation, it is
useful to consider the procedure with which the changes were accom-
plished. Labour realised that if the government was going to signifi-
cantly tighten its control over oil operations, then changes in offshore
terms would have to be made applicable to existing production
licences.' 1 This was because it was generally (and correctly) assumed
that the largest fields, and those fields most susceptible to easy exploita-
tion, had already been discovered as of 1974. However, the production
licences granted pursuant to the first four rounds did not contain any
model clause stipulating a procedure for renegotiation. Under these cir-
cumstances, the government had three options open: (1) try to come to a
separate agreement with each licensee; (2) attempt to pass regulations
which might effect the changes without varying the licences; or (3) uni-
laterally vary the model clauses." 5 The first possible course of action
would have taken far too long, if indeed it could have achieved success at
602. D. WALKER, supra note 599, at 158-59.
603. See P. CAMERON, supra note 541, at 93.
604. See id. at 95.
605. Daintith, supra note 515, at 213-14.
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all. The oil companies had no desire to cooperate with Labour's initia-
tive and would undoubtedly have preferred to continue with the pre-1974
status quo. It was felt that the second solution would necessarily involve
some extremely complex drafting and almost inevitably result in confu-
sion and litigation. Thus, with some misgivings, the government opted
for the third approach. Although the proposed changes would certainly
be seen as a diminution of the value of the production licences, no com-
pensation was envisaged. The Conservative opposition protested that
this disregard of the principle of pacta sunt servanda"6 might well re-
bound on British interests abroad. °7 But, given the government's goals,
there did not seem to be any other viable alternative.
Accordingly, Parliament unilaterally varied the terms of pre-ex-
isting licences by virtue of section 18 of the Petroleum and Submarine
Pipe-lines Act 1975608 (PSPA). Model clauses which were in many re-
spects similar were made applicable to future licensing rounds by the
Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1976, °  passed pursuant to the
PPA. Possibly the most important of the new licence conditions was the
provision which gave the government power to impose production
controls. 1
The size of the UKCS discoveries indicated that when the North Sea
oil fields were brought on stream, the United Kingdom would attain self-
sufficiency. In this respect, Britain's offshore oil resources allow for a
greater measure of economic independence when compared to those of
the United States, which can reduce, but can probably never eliminate,
foreign imports. Legislating in the wake of the Arab oil crisis, Westmin-
ster's politicians wished to acquire controls which would allow a British
government to continue self-sufficiency for as long as possible. It must be
borne in mind, however, that at about that time oil companies were in-
vesting the huge capital sums necessary to begin production from their
offshore fields. Fearing that the production clauses might pre-empt such
a crucial investment, the government gave the corporations certain guar-
606. "Agreements (and stipulations) of the parties to a contract must be observed." BLACK'S
LAW DICIoNARY 999 (5th ed. 1979).
607. Daintith & Gault, supra note 581, at 36-37.
608. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975, ch. 74, § 18.
609. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1976 STAT. INST. No. 1129.
610. This power was appropriated with respect to previous and future licences. For previous
licences, see Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975, ch. 74, § 17. For future licences, see
Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1976 STAT. INST. No. 1129, sched. 5, cl. 16 (reenacted in
Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1982 STAT. INsT. No. 1000, sched. 5, cl. 15). For a discussion
of the political events surrounding the British government's appropriation of this control, see P.
CAMERON, supra note 541, at 117-23.
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antees concerning the use of the new powers under the so-called "Varley
Assurances," which were announced in Parliament on December 6, 1974
by Mr. Eric Varley, the then Secretary of Energy.611 The Varley Assur-
ances provided that no production cuts would be required from discover-
ies made before the end of 1975 until 1982 or four years after the start of
production from such a field, whichever was later.612 In addition, pro-
duction cuts were not to be made from a field discovered after 1975 pur-
suant to an existing licence (i.e., a licence granted in the first, second,
third, or fourth rounds) until the licence had recouped at least 150% of
capital costs. 613 Any future use of the powers would generally be limited
to a maximum reduction of twenty percent.61 4
The Department of Energy was also able to tighten its control over
exploration and development. Although the PSPA did not interfere with
the duration of rights under existing licences, new rounds were to be
conducted on a differing basis. The initial term was henceforth to be four
years.611 If by that time the work programme had not been imple-
mented, the licence would terminate. If the licensee fulfilled his obliga-
tions, he then had the option to continue the licence for an additional
three years, referred to as the "second term. '61 6 At the end of the second
term, the licensee was to have the further option of retaining up to one-
third of his acreage for a "third term" of thirty years. 617 The Depart-
ment of Energy was given additional power to require the submission of
a further exploration plan in the third term.618 But of greater signifi-
cance was the provision which allowed the government to require the
submission of development and production programmes.619 If the licen-
see's proposed programmes proved unsatisfactory, the government could
substitute its own approved versions, and if the licensee remained unco-
operative, the licence could be revoked.620




615. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1976 STAT. INST. No. 1129, sched. 5, cl. 3. The law
relating to the terms of production licences has been subsequently changed. See infra notes 736-39
and accompanying text.
616. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1976 STAT. INT. No. 1129, sched. 5, cl. 4.
617. Id. at sched. 5, cl. 5.
618. Id. at cl. 5(4); see also Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1982 STAT. INST. No. 1000,
sched. 5, cl. 13 (under current provisions, the Dep't of Energy retains the right to require the submis-
sion of an extra exploration programme).
619. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1976 STAT. INsT. No. 1129, sched. 5, cl. 15 (reen-
acted in Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1982 STAT. INST. No. 1000, sched. 5, cl. 14).
620. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1976 STAT. INST. No. 1129, sched. 5, cl. 40(2)(b)
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Labour also enacted a procedure which allowed the government to
take royalty in kind.621 As in the United States, this procedure was
designed to give the government proprietary access to national oil pro-
duction. Another major reform was the tightening of government con-
trol over the assignment of licence interests.622 With the exception of
model clauses governing the duration of licence terms, the preceding
changes were reenacted in substantially similar form by the Petroleum
(Production) Regulations 1982.623
2. BNOC: The National Oil Company
A major difference between the oil and gas systems of America and
Britain is that the latter has a national oil company. America has always
relied solely upon private enterprise to exploit its mineral resources. But
in the British National Oil Corporation (BNOC), a legislative creation of
th PSPA, the British government signaled its intent to use both a private
and public approach in the development of British offshore oil. Despite
the fact that major changes in the operation of BNOC were effectuated
by the later Conservative government of Mrs. Thatcher, the BNOC re-
tains a major role in the British oil industry.
The bitter experience of Mr. Edward Heath in 1973 had been that
British government at that time had little or no control over the coun-
try's supply of oil. The government's long-standing equity powers over
BP had never really been exercised, and when BP was requested to favor
the United Kingdom in its allocation of supply in 1973-74, BP replied
that its primary responsibility was to its international customers.624 La-
bour hoped that a national oil company with appropriate powers would
do much to remedy this situation. It was felt that, vis-i-vis the oil indus-
try, Britain in some respects was in a very weak bargaining position. Af-
ter the fourth licensing round of 1971-72, a total of 192,400 square
(reenacted in Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1982 STAT. INsr. No. 1000, sched. 5, cl.
39(2)(b)).
621. "In kind" royalty takes the form of oil, rather than cash, payments. The power to take
royalty in kind was appropriated with respect to previous and future licences. For previous licences,
see Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975, sched. 2, part II, cl. 11. For future licences, see
Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1976 STAT. INT. No. 1129, sched. 5, cl. 11 (reenacted in
Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1982 STAT. INST. No. 1000, sched. 5, cl. 10).
622. This power was appropriated with respect to previous and future licences. For previous
licences, see Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975, sched. 2, part 11, cl. 38. For future
licences, see Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1976 STAT. INST. No. 1129, sched. 5, cl. 39 (reen-
acted in Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1982 STAT. INT. No. 1000, sched. 5, cl. 38).
623. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1982 STAT. INT. No. 1000; see supra notes 619-22.
624. See P. CAMBRON, supra note 541, at 66.
1985]
21
Vass: A Comparison of American and British Offshore Oil Development dur
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1985
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
kilometers of the UKCS-an area larger than the total amount of OCS
acreage ever leased-had been licenced.625 Yet in 1971, the Department
of Trade and Industry (which at that time was responsible for the regula-
tion of UKCS operations) had only seven technical staff competent in the
handling of offshore matters.6 26 The BNOC was envisaged as a means
for obtaining the technical and commercial expertise necessary for deal-
ing with the multinational oil corporations. Additionally, the profits of a
state oil company would not become a source for a private investor's
dividends, but would rather be channeled into the national coffers,
thereby enabling Britain to obtain more economic rent.627
Initial speculation suggested that BP might be transformed into the
government's chosen instrument of national control. BP, an essentially
private oil company, was decidedly unenthusiastic. Many doubted the
corporation's reliability in such a role, and the government feared that if
BP became the state oil company, its developing interests in America,
particularly in Alaska's North Slope, might be prejudiced. Thus it was
decided that an entirely new corporation would be required to achieve
national aspirations.628
It should be emphasised that Labour at no time proposed the na-
tionalisation of the North Sea industry. Such a course would have been
far too expensive if it had been undertaken with compensation. If it had
been attempted without compensation, very serious rifts in foreign rela-
tions with the United States would have taken place. BNOC was instead
destined to be a major state participator working in tandem with the
British and multinational private sector in UKCS development. On Jan-
uary 1, 1976, the BNOC was enacted into existence as a state corporation
through section 1(1) of the PSPA.62 9 Part one of the PSPA defined, in a
manner not dissimilar to the articles of association of a private company,
the powers, rights, and duties of BNOC.630 The PSPA provided that
BNOC was to be managed by a board consisting of not less than eight
and not more than twenty suitably qualified people chosen by the Secre-
625. Daintith & Gault, supra note 581, at 33.
626. P. CAMERON, supra note 541, at 88.
627. See WHrm PAPER ON UNITED KINGDOM OFSHORE OIL AND GAS POLICY, CMD. 5696
(1974), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERmiALS 460 (1975) [hereinafter cited as WHrrE PAPER].
628. Forster & Zillman, supra note 600, at 63-64.
629. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975, ch. 74, § 1(1). For further discussion of the
Act's provisions relating to BNOC, see P. CAMERON, supra note 541, at 139-44; Brenscheidt, Petro-
leum Legislation in the North Sea Countries, 11 TEx. INT'L L.J. 281, 296-97 (1976); Forster &
Ziliman, supra note 600, at 65-67.
630. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe.lines Act, 1975, ch. 74, §§ 1-16.
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tary of Energy.63' At least two members of the Board had to be civil
servants.632 Section 2(1) gave the BNOC fairly wide general powers to
operate as a normal oil company. It could engage, for example, in explo-
ration, production, transportation, marketing, and refining.6 33 But sec-
tion 2(4) qualified these concessions by requiring the consent of the
Secretary of State and the approval of the Treasury for activities such as
refining or foreign exploration.6 34 Section 2(1) provided that the BNOC
could perform any task related to petroleum requested by a Minister of
the Crown, and could undertake any obligation arising from offshore
participation agreements.6 35 These provisions set forth the practical
means by which BNOC was to play a role in the operation of pre-1975
licences.
Section 3 of the PSPA further elaborated upon the duties of the
BNOC. The BNOC was required to give notice whenever it began new
projects or enterprises and was required to furnish advice on all relevant
matters to the Secretary of Energy.6 36 The BNOC was also charged with
undertaking any action which was required by the Energy Department
and related to Crown-controlled pipelines or storage facilities, or petro-
leum which was the property of, or held on behalf of, the Crown.6 37 Sec-
tion 4 gave the Secretary of Energy the right to give BNOC mandatory
general or specific directions. 638 As British ministers of state are not usu-
ally given the power to issue specific directions to state corporations, the
latter provision illustrates the importance which was attached by the
Labour government in acquiring a tight rein over BNOC operations.639
BNOC's profits were to be paid into a National Oil Account.'
Although BNOC was not allowed to retain its profits, neither was it re-
quired to pay Labour's new Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT).641 By virtue
of section 6, the corporation was given power to borrow funds from the
Secretary or other institutions subject to Secretarial and Treasury ap-
631. Id. § 1(2).
632. Id. § l(3)(c).
633. Id. § 2(1).
634. Id. § 2(4).
635. Id. § 2(1)(d), (e).
636. Id. § 3(2), (3).
637. Id. § 3(5).
638. Id. § 4(1).
639. See Forster & Zillman, supra note 600, at 66.
640. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975, ch. 74, § 40(2). This provision has subse-
quently been changed. See infta notes 845-46 and accompanying text.
641. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975, ch. 74, § 9. This provision has subse-
quently been altered. See infra note 734 and accompanying text.
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proval. 642 BNOC was also afforded the power to borrow £600 million to
finance initial operations.6 3 The Secretary of Energy could increase this
amount to £900 million at his discretion. 
4
It will be recalled that during the first four licensing rounds, espe-
cially the second and third, the National Coal Board (NCB) and the Brit-
ish Gas Corporation (BGC) managed to obtain a share in some of the
licence awardsr45 But these shares were not large and only BGC had
acquired actual operating experiencef 46 The NCB's interests in six oil
fields were transferred for £100 million to BNOC. 7 The BGC, how-
ever, was permitted to retain its offshore oil interests. 8 In addition,
BNOC in 1976 acquired the North Sea licence properties of the failing
Burmah Oil Company, which included shares in the Ninian and Thistle
fields. 9
Having created a national oil company, Labour had to ensure that
the company would be able to play a leading role in present and future
UKCS exploitation. Britain's discretionary system of licensing could
easily be used to facilitate this result with respect to future licence offer-
ings. As with the changing of the model clauses, however, the real diffi-
culty lay in the alteration of previously agreed upon contracts. Although
the government at first threatened to unilaterally grant BNOC participa-
tion rights in pre-existing licences, this solution was not ultimately
adopted.650 Instead, the government announced that it would negotiate
majority state participation and promised that the oil companies would
neither gain nor lose as a result. However, the government also made it
known that companies which were uncooperative in beginning discus-
642. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975, ch. 74, § 6(1).
643. Id. § 6(3).
644. Id.
645. See supra note 571 and accompanying text.
646. This experience had been gained in two blocks in the Irish Sea for which BGC was the sole
licensee. See Woodcliffe, State Participation in the Development of United Kingdom Offshore Petro-
leum Resources, 1977 PuB. L. 249, 252.
647. See Millard, supra note 545, at 437; see also Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act, 1975,
ch. 74, § 13 (providing for transference of shares at a sum equal to face value).
648. Forster & Zillman, supra note 600, at 66.
649. Id. at 70.
650. Woodcliiffe, supra note 646, at 257. It might also be noted that Labour did take other action
apart from the creation of BNOC to guarantee security of supply. In particular, sections 1, 2, 3, 4,
and 6 of the Energy Act, 1976, ch. 76, give the government very wide power over the national oil
supply. Section 6, for example, allows the Secretary of State to force oil producers to keep their
U.K. stocks at a given level. See Energy Act, 1976, ch. 76, § 6(2)(a),(b). Only in an extreme situa-
tion would such powers be used, however.
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sions would be prejudiced in the new licensing round of 1976.6 Con
versely, the government promised that cooperation would be a favorable
factor that would be taken into account in later rounds.65 2 By 1977,
agreements had been made with respect to all pre-existing licences.65 3
These agreements differed on details, but the main features were twofold:
BNOC was to be given the right to buy up to fifty-one percent of produc-
tion and allowed to sit on all operating committees.654 It was hoped that
these new contracts would provide the type of national control over sup-
ply and access to corporate information sought by the Labour
government.
The government held a fifth round of licensing in 1976. One of the
relevant licence criteria was that all applications had to provide for fifty-
one percent participation by BNOC or BGC.6 5 The form that this ar-
rangement took was as follows. BNOC was given the right to become a
fifty-one percent equity owner in every licence65 6 and, like other licence
share owners, the corporation was thereafter required to contribute to
exploration and development costs. 6 7 The only exception to BNOC's eq-
uity right occurred when BGC was offered a share in a licence. In that
case, the combined share of BNOC and BGC had to be equal to, or
greater than, fifty-one percent.65 8
The sixth round of 1978 was conducted on similar, but somewhat
more state-oriented lines. It was expected that a larger than fifty-one
percent interest for BNOC would be offered, and that favor would be
given to applicants who were prepared to waive BNOC's obligation to
pay exploration and development costs, and who would give BNOC the
option of purchasing part of their equity share in production.6 59 In the
same year, the government decided that two further important privileges
would be granted to BNOC and BGC. First, the government decided
that state companies would be given the opportunity to obtain produe-
651. Amoco, the last oil company to accept licence revisions, had all of its applications for fifth
round awards denied. See Daintith & Gault, supra note 581, at 37.
652. See Millard, supra note 545, at 442-43.
653. See P. CAMERON, supra note 541, at 155-56.
654. See generally P. CAMERON, supra note 541, at 147-56 (setting forth the details of some of
the most important agreements).
655. See Baker & Daniel, BNOC and PriPatisation-The Past and the Future, 1 J. ENERGY &




659. See Millard, supra note 545, at 427-28.
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tion licences at times other than during licensing rounds."" Second, the
government decided that BNOC would be given the chance to accept any
offer of offshore acreage before any part of a licence interest could be
transferred.661
The four years from 1976 to 1979 saw BNOC develop from a paper
organisation to a substantial and potent influence in the British oil indus-
try. The corporation was involved in development work from the outset
due to its inherited stake in the Thistle field.662 In the second year of its
existence, BNOC participated in a considerable amount of exploratory
work, and in 1978 it encountered its first potentially economic discovery
on fifth round acreage.663 The same year marked the beginning of
BNOC's oil trading role and the start of production from the Thistle
field. The BNOC's North Sea equity holdings and the BNOC's rights to
purchase a large share of the oil from fields where it had no such hold-
ings made the corporation the effective arbiter of the price of North Sea
crude oil.
Lord Frank Kearton was appointed as the first Chairman of
BNOC's Board and the first Chief Executive. Previously, Lord Kearton
had held the directorship of Cortaulds, but had no background in the oil
industry. His relations with the contemporary Secretary of Energy, Mr.
Anthony Benn, were close, and this relationship enhanced BNOC's role
as advisor to the government on oil-related matters. 6 " Indeed, BNOC's
function as industry counsel to the Department of Energy was high-
lighted by such practices as reviewing development plans submitted by
private oil companies.665 It was, of course, easy for the government to
suggest that BNOC should give preference to British goods and services.
This was evidenced in 1977 and 1978 when the state oil company bought
"jack-up" rigs, for which it had no immediate use, from the threatened
Marathon shipyard in Clydebank.666 As British voters again ventured to
the polls in May of 1979, BNOC could justifiably claim to have achieved
many of the goals set for it by Labour in 1974.
660. See 947 PARL. DEn., H.C. (5th ser.) 439 (1978).
661. Id.; see Forster & Ziliman, supra note 600, at 75.
662. Forster & Zillman, supra note 600, at 76.
663. Id.
664. Id. at 69, 77.
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3. The New System of Taxation
As discussed before, the Public Accounts Committee Report of 1972
was sharply critical of the then Conservative government's North Sea
taxation policy.667 The dramatic rise in the cost of petroleum following
the Arab oil embargo stimulated the new Labour administration to com-
pletely reassess the offshore tax regime. One of the government's main
objectives was to recoup what it regarded as the oil companies' "enor-
mous and uncovenanted profits." '668 On the other hand, the government
had to balance this desire with the consideration that the new system
should not prejudice the development of the discoveries of the early
1970's. The Conservative opposition accorded much more weight to the
latter factor. As future Conservative Minister of State for Energy, Ham-
ish Gray, put it, "[tihe object at the time was to get the oil out of the
ground at the earliest possible moment following the ghastly price rises
of 1973. "669
The result of these deliberations was the Oil Taxation Act 1975.670
This legislation introduced for the first time in the United Kingdom a
separate tax on oil revenues, the Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT). The
PRT is a supplement to the previously applicable revenue devices, the
corporation tax and the royalty payment. Initially levied at forty-five
percent,671 the PRT is calculated before corporation tax. Unlike the lat-
ter, the PRT is not charged against single companies with respect to all
of their relevant United Kingdom operations. Instead, it is charged
against participating licence shares in oilfields.672 The reason for this so-
called "ring fence" provision was that Labour wanted to be able to levy
the tax against commercial discoveries without having to consider the
licensee's costs and losses from other activities.
A number of tax reliefs were instituted to minimise this new disin-
centive to exploit earlier finds. For instance, corporations were not to be
subjected to the PRT until commercial production had paid for at least
175% of the corporation's capital coStS.6 7 3 The corporations were also
given an "oil allowance" of ten million tonnes per field on which the
667. See supra notes 592-95 and accompanying text.
668. WurrE PAPER, supra note 627, at 461.
669. Letter from the Rt. Hon. the Lord Gray of Contin, P.C., Minister of State for Energy in the
first Thatcher administration (1979-83), to the Author (July 3, 1984).
670. Oil Taxation Act, 1975, ch. 22.
671. Id. § 1(2).
672. Id. § 1(1)(1).
673. Id. § 2(9)(b).
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PRT would not be charged.6 74 In addition, the PRT was not to be levied
on fields earning less than a thirty percent return on invested capital. 675
Labour decided to change the rate and allowances of PRT in 1979
when it found that the reliefs had worked too successfully and that no
PRT at all had been paid until 1978.676 Indeed, the sum of all revenues
from North Sea oil only totaled £562 million in 1978-79.677 By compari-
son, the OCS, a much less intensively developed offshore area, contrib-
uted a total of $2941 million by way of bonuses, royalties, and rentals to
the United States Treasury in 1978.678 Accordingly, Labour planned to
increase the rate of the PRT to sixty percent and to cut back on capital
allowances. 67 9 Before these changes could be implemented, however, a
new Conservative administration was elected to power.
V. BRITISH OFFSHORE OIL DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE
THATCHER ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Callaghan's Labour government was not returned by the British
electorate in 1979. Instead, the Conservative party, led by Mrs.
Thatcher, was elected with a handsome parliamentary majority. In order
to properly explain the new government's energy policy, it will be neces-
sary to review the contemporary economic situation, the ongoing evolu-
tion of UKCS development, and the dominant strands in Conservative
philosophy.
The 1970's was, on the whole, an extremely bad decade for the Brit-
ish economy. It was marked by labor discontent, inflation, and low pro-
ductivity. The real difficulties began to manifest themselves after the
1973-74 oil crisis, which quadrupled the price of oil. But the deficiencies
in British industry which caused the results of that crisis to be so malig-
nant were of a deeper nature. Large sections of the United Kingdom
economy were based on the traditional heavy industries. The steel, ship-
building, and coal industries had all been nationalised after the war and
suffered from overmanning and inefficiency. These and other such indus-
tries found it increasingly difficult to compete in a much more interde-
pendent and competitive world. As a result, the 1970's witnessed the
beginning of a new restructuring of British industry, a process which
674. Id. § 8(6).
675. Id. § 9(1).
676. See P. CAMERON, supra note 541, at 191.
677. U. K. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 534, at 20.
678. MwIRmis MGMT. SERviCE, supra note 549, at 51.
679. THE ECONOMIST, July 29, 1978, at 86, 86.
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continues to the present. Unfortunately, the transition into the new elec-
tronic and less labor-intensive age has proved to be painful for the British
economy.68
0
The Arab oil embargo threw Britain, along with the rest of the
Western World, into a recession. The resulting inflationary spiral was
especially vicious in the United Kingdom, where annual price increases
averaged 16.3% in the years 1974-7861 and rose by 200% in the decade
from 1967 to 1977.682 Productivity, on the other hand, rose by only
twenty-seven percent during the same period.683 There was a great deal
of union unrest throughout the post-embargo era, particularly in the
heavily unionised public sector. Indeed, two out of the four British gen-
eral elections of the 1970's, those held in 1974 and 1979, were in large
measure precipitated by the action of labor unions. The Labour govern-
ment's interventionist policies mitigated the effect of the recession on the
unemployment figures. But this approach necessitated high levels of
public expenditure and accordingly pushed up the level of government
borrowing.684
North Sea oil began to flow in significant quantities in 1977, and by
1978, the 52.8615 million tonnes landed accounted for 80.5% of British
oil consumption.686 The main economic benefits which accrued from
North Sea oil were twofold. First, Britain's balance of payments position
was transformed. In late 1979, The Economist stated that "[w]ithout oil
and gas, Britain would be heading for an international crisis with a 10
billion [pounds] current account deficit .... ,687 Second, the economy,
having received vast amounts of oil-related investment, received a major
boost. By 1979, it was possible to predict that the United Kingdom
would soon be energy self-sufficient, and that for the first half of the
1980's Britain would probably produce in excess of her needs. 688 One of
the reasons why Labour felt confident about increasing the PRT in early
680. For several interesting discussions concerned with Britain's industrial problems, see British
Industry in Miniature at Merthyr Tydfil, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 1, 1979, at 79; Brittan, How British
is the British Sickness?, 21 J.L. & ECON. 245 (1978); Cranston & Pur, Government as Entrepreneur
and Planner: Aspects of Recent Industrial Strategy in Britain, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L. 78 (1979).
681. How the War was Lost, THB EcoNoMIsr, Sept. 1, 1979, at 80.
682. Id.
683. Kreidmann, Inflation: A Global Enigma, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.. 349, 356 (1979).
684. Mr. Callaghan, the last Labour Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, claimed that his
government's interventionist policies had saved a million jobs in declining industries. See Taxcut-
ter's Election, THE EcoNOMmr, Apr. 21, 1979, at 13, 13.
685. U. K. DEP'T op ENERGY, supra note 534, at 52.
686. Putting Steam Behind an EEC Energy Policy, THE ECONOMisT, Sept. 1, 1979, at 38.
687. Worse and Worse, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 22, 1979, at 100.
688. Letter from the Rt. Hon. the Lord Gray of Contin, P.C., supra note 669.
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1979 was that, for the most part, the expenditure necessary to fully de-
velop the finds of the early and mid-1970's had already been
committed. 68 9
When the Shah of Iran's regime was overthrown in 1979, a second
oil crisis followed. This time the price of oil doubled over a period of
about a year.6 90 The crisis again sent the Western World into a reces-
sion. For Britain it was to be the worst downturn since the 1930's.
The new Conservative government believed in a society based on
free enterprise and, consequently, hoped that as much of Labour's public
sector legacy as possible could be "privatised." More fundamentally, the
Conservatives saw inflation and inefficiency as the main reasons for Brit-
ain's economic troubles. Inflation was seen as directly connected to the
Treasury's public borrowing, or, as it was termed, the "public sector bor-
rowing requirement" (PSBR). Accordingly, the linchpin of the Con-
servative's new monetary strategy was to control and cut PSBR. The
fight to defeat inflation was seen as the most important governmental
goal. While it was known that the projected cuts in public expenditure
would result in a major increase in unemployment, it was felt that this
was an unavoidable consequence of the interventionism of the past. It
was envisaged that British industry could never be competitive and prof-
itable till restrictive trade practices and overmanning were eliminated. 691
These policies were dissimilar to those of the government's Socialist
predecessor and, for that matter, to previous Conservative administra-
tions. Since the last war, the latter had endorsed a considerable degree of
state intervention and had never attempted to denationalise significant
parts of the public sector. By no means did all of the Conservative party
fully support the new approach, and these elements tempered, particu-
larly in the first three years from 1979 to 1981, the new market-based
economic strategy.
A. Conservative Oil and Gas Policy
A clear and concise initial summation of UKCS policy was never
given by Mr. David Howell, the newly appointed Secretary of Energy.
Nevertheless, an idea of the Conservative government's UKCS objectives
689. North Sea oil companies over a barrel, THE ECONOMST, July 29, 1978, at 86.
690. Stop Oil doubling again, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 29, 1980, at 13.
691. For a further discussion of general Conservative policy, see Sir Geoffrey Sees the Books,
THE ECONOmiST, May 26, 1979, at 15; The Fall and Rise of Margaret Thatcher, THE ECONOMIST,
Apr. 21, 1979, at 39.
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can be obtained from policy statements on individual issues and from
subsequent government actions.
The Conservatives believed that Labour interventionism had caused,
in the words of the strongly pro-market Daily Telegraph, "[a] massive
lack of investment in the North Sea over the past two or three years."6 92
By way of contrast, the Conservatives hoped to recreate conditions
which would again induce private enterprise into further exploring and
developing the UKCS. As Mr. Nigel Lawson, who succeeded Mr.
Howell at the Department of Energy, said in 1981, "[i]t is private enter-
prise which made the North Sea the outstanding success that it is, and it
is the private sector which is the key to its continued success." '693 Since
future discoveries were likely to be made in smaller, technically complex,
and more remote areas, it was felt that government had to do more in the
way of encouraging exploration by the oil companies. More exploration,
it was thought, would certainly be needed to fully appraise the extent of
the UKCS's resources and to prolong Britain's self-sufficiency. It was
anticipated that a further burst of North Sea activity would be of great
assistance to the British economy, especially in the beleaguered northern
portion of the country, where many of the rig building yards were
located.
Thus far it has been shown that the goals of Mrs. Thatcher's govern-
ment were similar to those espoused by Secretary Watt at the outset of
the Reagan administration. But other aspects of Conservative policy
gave the new British offshore oil regime a somewhat different flavor. The
second oil crisis of 1979 reiterated to the British government the value of
an indigenous supply of oil. Mr. Howell and his cabinet colleagues real-
ised that Britain, as a member of the European Economic Community
(EEC), was part of the largest oil-consuming market in the world. The
multinational oil corporations, it was feared, would sell to the highest
bidder in this extremely competitive marketplace. The Conservatives, no
less than Labour, responded to this situation by following a policy of
state control over oil supply.694
Another issue which created a considerable difference, at least ini-
tially, between the Thatcher and Reagan oil strategies, related to the
maximisation of economic rent or revenue. It was clear in 1979 that the
impending recession and the Tory policy of making industry "leaner and
692. The Daily Telegraph (London), July 10, 1979, at 8, col. 6.
693. The Times (London), Oct. 20, 1981, at 1, col. 2.
694. See, e.g., id., at 6, col. 1. (statement of Secretary of Energy Nigel Lawson in the House of
Commons, Oct. 19, 1981).
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fitter" would result in a short-term deflation of the economy, more unem-
ployment, less revenues, and more need for social expenditure.6 95 If the
government planned to reduce public borrowing, then it would certainly
be necessary to raise extra Treasury funds by increasing taxation in some,
if not all, sectors of the economy. The oil companies, whose profits had
risen again due to the 100% increase in the price of oil, became an obvi-
ous target.
6 96
To recapitulate, the goals of the Conservative government were:
(1) to encourage exploration; (2) to create a market-oriented operating
climate; (3) to use UKCS oil to boost the British economy; (4) to max-
imise oil revenues; (5) to attempt to prolong British self-sufficiency; and
(6) to continue national controls over oil supply. Not surprisingly, the
difficulty with this set of goals is that they logically conflict. For exam-
ple, the maximisation of revenues tends to lead to the minimisation of
exploration, development, and production, while the retention of con-
trols over supply produces a less market-oriented operating system. The
implementation of the Conservative government's interrelated, and
sometimes contradictory polices, will now be considered in two stages:
"Stage One," which lasted from May 1979 to September 1981, and
"Stage Two," which covers the period of time from September 1981 to
the present.
B. Oil Industry Concerns at the Outset of Stage One
Since the British Conservatives, like the American Republicans, de-
pend on free enterprise to develop offshore oil, it seems pertinent to begin
this part of the essay by examining the views held by the British oil in-
dustry at the outset of the Thatcher administration. There were four
major areas of concern to industry: (1) the future role of BNOC; (2) de-
pletion policy; (3) exploration policy; and (4) taxation.
1. BNOC
A number of the large American oil corporations, especially Gulf
and Conoco, were quite enthusiastic about forming bidding consortia
with the NCB and BGC in the early days of North Sea exploration.697
According to Cameron, early state involvement "did not in practice dif-
695. The Daily Telegraph (London), Aug. 10, 1979, at 15, col. 2.
696. BP's after tax profits in the first quarter of 1979 amounted to £281.9 million. This com-
pares with £85.6 million in the first quarter of 1978. The Daily Telegraph (London), June 8, 1979, at
21, col. 2.
697. P. CAMERoN, supra note 541, at 84-85.
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fer from that of a private oil company participating in a joint venture."69
But the oil companies refrained from similar treatment of the BNOC,
which, after all, had been charged by Labour with a far more ambitious
role. The BNOC had been created to swell economic rent, to increase
government bargaining power vis-A-vis the oil industry, and to ensure a
measure of control over oil supply.
There were possibly three main reasons why the private sector was
so opposed to this form of state intervention. First, in broad terms, in-
dustry regarded BNOC as an unwarranted and duplicative public enter-
prise, attempting to perform a task that the private oil industry was
always better equipped to handle.699 Second, BNOC's special operating
privileges were seen as a means by which the corporation's creators had
endeavored to compensate for the national oil company's shortcomings.
The individual privileges were all sources of rancour, as it was charged
that BNOC's access to Treasury funding constituted an unfair advantage
not afforded to the oil companies who, by comparison, often found it
difficult to obtain loan stock. The BNOC's exemption from the PRT was
regarded by private industry as a considerable cash flow benefit. Fur-
thermore, the first refusal right and the opportunity given to BNOC and
BGC to acquire licence acreage outside normal rounds were regarded as
gratuitous favors. Put simply, industry was deeply unhappy with
BNOC's close advisory relations with the government and believed that
this arrangement fostered the undermining of confidential business plan-
ning.7' Finally, BNOC's distributive role was also the subject of attack.
The participation agreements and criteria for the fifth and sixth rounds
enabled BNOC to become the major trader in North Sea oil, giving it the
effective power to set the price of that oil. Although many of the partici-
pation agreements provided for the resale of oil from BNOC back to the
original producers if they needed such oil for their British demand, it was
felt that the UKCS marketing system, at the very least, severely limited
corporate discretion. At worst, the UKCS marketing system probably
lost some lucrative trading opportunities abroad.70 '
698. Id. at 85.
699. The animosity of private industry towards BNOC was exemplified by the comments of Mr.
James Longcroft, the Chairman of Tricentrol Oil Company, who regarded BNOC as "a socialist
concept." The Times (London), Mar. 25, 1983, at 21, col. 3.
700. Industry's position towards BNOC's operating privileges is discussed in Forster & Zillman,
supra note 600, at 80-81.
701. P. CAMERON, supra note 541, at 151.
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2. Depletion Policy
In the 1970's, it was possible to predict that oil from the UKCS
would, for a number of years in the early 1980's, be more than sufficient
to meet United Kingdom oil consumption. 7 2 Actually, self-sufficiency
occurred faster than some earlier forecasts suggested because the two oil
crises resulted in an impressive degree of conservation.7 3 Additionally,
cheaper alternatives, like UKCS natural gas, became increasingly avail-
able during the 1970's.7° So, while energy independence continued to be
a goal of both British and American governments after the 1973-74 em-
bargo, the faster rate of development in the UKCS, allied with its rela-
tively greater riches, presented the British with the additional problem of
how to deal with overproduction. Early in 1980, the United Kingdom
Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA) estimated that continental
shelf oil production would peak at about 2.3 million barrels per day in
1982-83.701 Assuming that British consumption would continue at about
1.8 million barrels per day, the study postulated that the United King-
dom would produce more than her net requirements for as long as from
1981 to 1987.706 Further assuming that British consumption did not fall
very far from the 1.8 million barrels per day figure, there were a number
of methods the government could employ in extending the period of self-
sufficiency.
In particular, the government could utilise the production controls
unilaterally created by the previous Labour government. The oil compa-
nies were opposed to this option. If implemented, production controls
would restrict oil trading when the price was rising and when demand
was very strong.70 7 Because the oil industry had sunk large amounts of
resources into the development of fields that might not be allowed to
produce properly, there was a possibility that further inequity might re-
sult. Wider economic and, indeed, international arguments, could also
be deployed against the use of production controls. Oil exports, of
course, improve balance of payments. But in the international context, a
702. See supra note 688 and accompanying text.
703. United Kingdom oil consumption dropped 35% between 1973 and 1983. The Energy Di-
lemma, an address by J.M. Raisman, Chairman and Chief Executive of Shell U.K. Ltd., to the Coal
Industry Society, Hyde Park Hotel, London 2 (Feb. 7, 1983).
704. Id.
705. Shell U.K. Ltd., supra note 584, at chart 2.
706. Id.
707. During the summer of 1979, exceptionally strong demand created a "Western panic to get
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reduction in oil flow would cause rifts between Britain and her European
partners. The EEC could potentially be damaged by the prospect of
West Germany and France suffering from a shortage of oil, while the
Community's only large producer simultaneously restricted supply. It
was also argued that production control would limit corporate cash flow
and therefore deny the oil industry the internal financing it required to
undertake new exploration and development-" 8 It should be observed at
this point that production restraint is not the only method of depletion
policy, but it is the most effective. Delaying the approval of development
plans, for instance, is yet another method. But because of lead times,
however, such deferrals do not affect production immediately.
3. Exploration Policy
The years 1979-80 were dismal years for exploratory activity on the
UKCS. In 1979, only thirty-three exploration wells-less than half of
the seventy-nine exploratory wells sunk in 1975-were drilled.7 09 In
1978, the UKOOA estimated that exploratory rates would have to
double in order to produce the smaller, more complex discoveries likely
to extend British self-sufficiency into the 1990's.71° Here, a strong com-
parison can be drawn between offshore exploration in the United King-
dom and the United States. In both countries, it is believed that future
oil supplies will be primarily drawn from deepwater fields in frontier con-
tinental shelf areas. The profitability of the British oil industry, like its
American counterpart, depends on access to adequate hydrocarbon
reserves. The UKCS and the Norwegian Continental Shelf are the only
major oil-producing regions in Western Europe. If oil corporations are
to continue to support their British refining capacity, then a geographi-
cally proximate and politically stable supply is vital.
Unfortunately, neither the UKCS nor the American OCS were be-
ing adequately explored at the close of the 1970's. United Kingdom op-
erators tended to blame BNOC, the tax regime, and the disappointing
availability of licence acreage as the dominant reasons for the British
slowdown. The Labour government's policy in the fifth and sixth rounds
had focused on reducing the number of blocks to be offered; 117 blocks
had been offered in those two rounds, while 435 had been offered in the
708. Shell U.K. Ltd., supra note 584, at 5.
709. U. K. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 534, at 34.
710. Hirst, How fast should we deplete our reserves?, The Times (London), Apr. 25, 1980 (special
feature), at 11, col. 4.
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fourth round."' 1 As the price of oil began to rise steeply in 1979-80, oil
companies understandably wished to gain access to new offshore areas.
The UKOOA reckoned that at the start of the 1970's, thirty-three per-
cent of the UKCS had been licenced. By 1980, the organisation claimed,
this area had dropped to ten percent.712
4. Taxation
When a rise in PRT was first considered in 1978, there were mutter-
ings from the multinational oil corporations about an imminent depar-
ture from the North Sea.713 When the Conservatives came to office in
1979, the oil industry asserted that the tax regime was too rigorous.
High taxation, they argued, could just as easily rob the industry of the
necessary funds for continuing exploration and development as could
production controls.714 The UKOOA view was well summed up in the
words of J. M. Raisman, the Chairman of Shell U.K. Limited:
If North Sea oil is seen primarily as a floating fund for servicing the
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement, or as a mechanism for a quick
fix whenever a new economic ailment manifests itself on the body poli-
tic, it can only disrupt the steady progress that is essential if its devel-
opment is to provide a sound basis for the future prosperity of this
country.715
C. Stage One
An analysis will now be undertaken of the Conservative govern-
ment's handling of the preceding four areas from May 1979 to September
1981. The forthcoming discussion will suggest that initial Tory energy
policy never reached the same degree of harmony as that demonstrated
by the programs of Secretaries Watt, Clark, and Hodel.
1. BNOC
It is the opinion of Forster and Zillman that if Mrs. Thatcher had
been elected in 1976 or 1977, it is probable that BNOC would have been
an early casualty of the new economic policy.716 But in 1979, while the
711. U. K. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 534, at 32.
712. Hirst, supra note 710, at II, col. 4.
713. See North Sea oil companies over a barrel, THE ECONOMIsT, July 29, 1978, at 86.
714. See, eg., The Daily Telegraph (London), May 5, 1979, at 23, col. 2 (noting Esso's view of
British oil taxation).
715. North Sea Oil: The Economic Opportunities, an address by J.M. Raisman, Chairman and
Chief Executive of Shell U.K. Ltd., to the Guid Club, St. Andrews University, St. Andrews, Scot-
land 5 (Jan. 21, 1981).
716. Forster & Zillman, supra note 600, at 78-79.
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Conservatives remained sympathetic towards many of the oil industry's
complaints, their election manifesto merely stated that "[w]e shall under-
take a complete review of all the activities of the British National Oil
Corporation as soon as we take office." '717 The reason for the party's
caution was grounded in the second oil crisis. Despite the fact that the
United Kingdom was nearly self-sufficient in 1979, the country still suf-
fered shortages71 because of the exportation of high quality North Sea
crude oil. To compensate for this exportation, reliance was placed on
cheaper imported of1,719 which became increasingly scarce during the
summer of 1979.
Far from slackening state controls over oil supply, the Conservatives
found it necessary to tighten them. In June 1979, oil companies were
given six months notice that royalties would be required in kind.720 Sec-
retary Howell also used his discretion to limit flaring of natural gas in an
attempt to encourage corporations to channel supplies of oil to the
United Kingdom.72' For some time the supply situation looked very
grave, and many companies found that their available stocks were be-
coming insufficient to meet more than two months of normal demand.
As a result, many corporations introduced a voluntary system of
rationing. 722
BNOC played a vital role during the crisis. Its option to purchase a
majority of British North Sea oil stocks723 placed Mrs. Thatcher in a
much stronger position than Mr. Heath had been in during the first oil
crisis. Though BNOC did not completely refrain from exporting its sup-
plies, it did direct much more oil into the home market "to ease supply
difficulties."724 In June 1979, plans to scrap BNOC completely were
dropped.725 As The Economist remarked in the same month, "[o]il sup-
ply and price chaos could not have come at a better time for the British




717. Financial Times (London), Apr. 12, 1979, at 11, col. 6.
718. Mhy the North Sea gushes, but the pumps run dry, THE ECONOMIST, June 16, 1979, at 77.
719. See UK Refinery Closures and North Sea Exports, SHELL U.K. REPORTS, Nov. 12, 1981.
720. The Tories are learning to love BNOC, THE ECONOMIST, June 9, 1979, at 111, 111.
721. Gribben, Study into gas pipeline network, The Daily Telegraph (London), June 26, 1979, at
21, col. 2.
722. Texaco, for instance, introduced rationing of its sales at the beginning of May 1979. The
Daily Telegraph (London), May 2, 1979, at 19, col. 2.
723. See North Sea oil companies over a barrel, supra note 713, at 86.
724. See The Daily Telegraph (London), July 26, 1979, at 21, col. 6.
725. Id., June 2, 1979, at 19, col. 3.
726. See The Tories are learning to love BNOC, supra note 720, at 111.
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Notwithstanding the fact that BNOC had impressed the govern-
ment with its usefulness as a state oil trader, the Conservative party still
objected to its operating role and associated privileges. These considera-
tions surfaced when Secretary Howell made an important announcement
concerning BNOC's immediate future in the House of Commons on July
26, 1979.727 Mr. Howell's statement expressed disappointment with a
"serious decline in offshore activity" and blamed BNOC for being "a
drag on North Sea development."728 He went on to outline major re-
strictions on BNOC's operating privileges.72 9 Specifically, the corpora-
tion's access to state financing via the National Oil Account was to be
terminated, as was the PRT exemption. 730 BNOC was to lose its oppor-
tunity to obtain licences outside licensing rounds and its first refusal
rights.731 Moreover, in the future it would have no right to sit on the
operating committees of licences in which it held no equity share.732 Its
advisory relationship with the government was also to be terminated, and
there would be no requirement in future licensing rounds that applica-
tions offer BNOC a fifty-one percent equity holding.733 Most of these
changes were effectuated by ministerial directives, but BNOC's new PRT
liability was statutorily created by section 22 of the Finance Act (No. 2)
1979,73 and BNOC's right to apply for licences at any time was removed
by the Petroleum (Production) (Amendment) Regulations 1980.7 31 The
latter regulations also instituted a return to two-term licences736 and
have subsequently been reenacted in the Petroleum (Production) Regula-
tions 1982. 737 The initial term for UKCS production licences is now six
years, and the continuing term is thirty years.738 In connection with the
latter term, there has also been a reduction in the surrender require-
ments.739 Secretary Howell hoped that BNOC's more limited role would
provide "the new impetus to restore exploration in the North Sea." 74°
727. The Daily Telegraph (London), July 27, 1979, at 1, col. 6 (the government announced that
BNOC could serve its purpose through "a much more limited role").
728. 971 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 894 (1979).





734. Finance Act (No. 2), 1979, ch. 47, § 22.
735. Petroleum (Production) (Amendment) Regulations, 1980 STAT. INST. No. 721, sched. 1.
736. See id. at sched. 2, (b).
737. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1982 STAT. INsr. No. 1000, Reg. 6(6) & sched. 5, cl.
3.
738. Id at sched. 5, cl. 3.
739. Id. at sched. 5, cls. 4-6.
740. The Daily Telegraph (London), July 27, 1979, at 10, col. 1.
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Despite the preceding changes, it was also announced that BNOC's
marketing operations would remain in state hands.74 1 No definite pledge
was set forth for BNOC's exploratory and development division. The
only light cast on this subject was Secretary Howell's remark that the
corporation's offshore assets, conservatively estimated to be worth £1000
million in 1979,742 "should be more widely owned."743 The privatisation
of such assets proved a tempting proposition for the government's Treas-
ury Department, whose new monetarist policy continually sought ways
to cut PSBR.74 In the short-term, PSBR was reduced by requiring
BNOC in October 1979 to negotiate a £500 million forward sale of
oil.745 The BNOC could confidently embark on the negotiation of such a
contract because of its quasi-monopoly hold over oil supplies. The same
tactic was used again in 198 1.4 In the late autumn of 1979, the govern-
ment began making plans to privatise BNOC's upstream activities.747
This proved to be a much more difficult task than originally envisaged
for a number of reasons.
To begin with, the government was afraid that if it sold BNOC's
operating division in a period of escalating oil prices (and an impending
Gulf war), it would be open to the charge that it had disposed of a valua-
ble, appreciating corporation. Accordingly, the government would be
vulnerable to Labour's charge that selling BNOC was nothing other than
a favor to City of London financiers.
BNOC's position was also very different from many of Britain's
other state industries. Instead of being structurally unsound, labor-inten-
sive, and ailing, BNOC was new, capital-intensive, and moderately prof-
itable. In April 1980, Mr. Ronald Utiger, BNOC's new chairman,
vigorously defended his corporation's record. He claimed that BNOC
had met government profitability targets set in 1978, drilled more UKCS
exploration wells than any other operator, and provided excellent service
to the country during the 1979 oil crisis.74 BNOC's profits, which were
all paid into the National Oil Account, were a matter of particular pride
to the state oil company. When allied with estimated profits of £1000
million per year during the coming period of peak North Sea produc-
741. Forster & Ziliman, supra note 600, at 80.
742. The Daily Telegraph (London), July 28, 1979, at 1, col. 2.
743. Forster & Zillman, supra note 600, at 80 n. 111.
744. P. CAMERON, supra note 541, at 166.
745. Any advance on £50(m?, THE ECONOmmsT, Oct. 13, 1979, at 90, 90.
746. Forster & Zillman, supra note 600, at 80.
747. See The Daily Telegraph (London), Nov. 12, 1979, at 36, col. 5.
748. Id., Apr. 22, 1980, at 17, col. 2.
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tion,7 49 the government realised that it might be financially more lucra-
tive for the Treasury if BNOC's operating arm was retained.
A third difficulty lay in the mechanics of privatisation. No British
government had ever attempted large-scale denationalisation before. A
particularly perplexing issue concerned the best means of transferring
BNOC's upstream division into the private sector. If the assets were
simply auctioned off, the probable beneficiaries of the former state hold-
ings would be the oil companies, possibly at a bargain price. If a subsidi-
ary was created and shares sold on the stock markets, questions would
arise as to the attractiveness of the equity, how to offer it, and whether
the markets could quickly cope with what would certainly be a very large
influx of buying. Since the government wished to retain BNOC's role in
oil trading, it was thought that any privatisation scheme would require
highly complex renegotiation of previous participation agreements.7"'
Notwithstanding these problems, the Conservative government, a
few months after it was elected, began considering how best to introduce
private equity into BNOC. But by the end of March 1980, it was an-
nounced that the privatisation measures would be delayed till autumn of
that year.75' The practical working out of the proposed denationalisation
scheme proved so arduous a task that the Energy Department temporar-
ily channeled its efforts into creating an opportunity for the public to
contribute loan capital to BNOC.75 2 It was envisaged that the loan stock
scheme (often referred to as the "LASMO" scheme because the London
and Scottish Marine Oil Company had utilised a similar idea for raising
debentures) would involve members of the public lending money to the
state corporation for particular fields in which BNOC held licence eq-
uity.753 The profitability of the bonds would be linked to development of
the appropriate individual fields.754 Secretary Howell introduced the loan
stock plan to the Conservative party conference in October 1980. He
propounded it as a chance to spread the spoils of the North Sea over a
wide section of the British public.755 The bonds would be available at
post offices in denominations as small as ten to twenty-five pounds.75 6
749. Id., June 30, 1980, at 17, col. 4.
750. Id.
751. Id., Mar. 26, 1980, at 21, col. 2.
752. See Baker & Daniel, supra note 655, at 151-52; The Times (London), Aug. 6, 1980, at 19,
col. 3.
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He also proposed that legislation be brought before the House of Com-
mons to facilitate the long awaited privatisation of BNOC's operating
division."7 It was carefully emphasised that neither measure would en-
danger the security of Britain's supply.
7 8
Many members of the Conservative party saw the loan stock scheme
as merely a way of covering up the government's failure to go ahead with
denationalisation. The Selsden group of Conservative M.P.'s, for in-
stance, thought it was "just one more example of the Government's
words being braver than their actions. ' 75 9 They argued that the public
loans to BNOC could never reduce PSBR or the state's role in the oil
industry.
The Petroleum and Continental Shelf Bill, introduced into Parlia-
ment in February 1981, gave BNOC the right to create subsidiaries to
take over its exploration and production activities.7" Shares in the sub-
sidiary or subsidiaries could then be sold to the public on approval of the
Department of Energy and the Treasury. 6' Mr. Hamish Gray, Minister
of State for Energy, confirmed shortly after the bill's introduction that no
particular plan for the sale of BNOC equity had been singled out for
special consideration.762 The loan stock proposal did not require
legislation.763
On March 26, 1981, the Leader of the House of Commons, Mr.
Francis Pym, announced that the Petroleum and Continental Shelf Bill
was being dropped from the legislative timetable for that session of Par-
liament because the bill had run out of time.76 In the same month, The
Times reported that "[g]overnment ministers, except for Mr. David
Howell, Secretary of State for Energy, are lukewarm at best over bring-
ing private capital into BNOC."765 Nevertheless, the commitment
continued.766
Mr. Geoffrey Howe, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, elaborated on
the loan stock plan in his budget speech of March 1981. He proposed the
issuance of about £500 million worth of the small bonds described
757. Id.
758. Id.
759. Id. at 19, col. 5.




764. See Baker & Daniel, supra note 655, at 151.
765. The Times (London), Mar. 20, 1981, at 17, col. 2.
766. See Baker & Daniel, supra note 655, at 151.
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above.76 7 But as spring turned into summer, no further concrete develop-
ments occurred, except continuing behind the scenes negotiation. At
least one commentator was therefore forced to conclude that "in two and
a half years as Energy Secretary David Howell had carried out virtually
none of the privatization pledges which the Government had made
before coming into power. '768
2. Depletion Policy
It was not until the beginning of 1980 that the Conservative govern-
ment announced its intention to use some form of depletion control to
iron out the "hump" of overproduction expected in the first half of the
1980's.769 Mr. Howell did not specify what form this action would take.
Previously, the approach had been to encourage maximum production, a
policy which was seen as creating the most beneficial effects on balance of
payments and Treasury receipts.
A potential set of obstacles to the government's depletion policy
were the Varley Assurances given during the previous Labour govern-
ment.770 The Varley Assurances precluded any use of production con-
trols on most North Sea fields until 1982 at the earliest. They also
limited the scope of production restrictions with respect to following
years. The Conservatives had no wish to alter the status of a set of guar-
antees which they had previously ratified.771
Mr. Howell wished to furnish the oil industry with a concise exposi-
tion of the new depletion system before applications for licence acreage
to be awarded in the seventh round of licensing became due in August
1980. The government's plans for curtailing output were explained in
the House of Commons on July 26, 1980,772 when the Secretary for En-
ergy stated that "on strategic and security of supply grounds it is in the
national interest to prolong high levels of United Kingdom Continental
Shelf production to the end of this century. '773 This could be achieved
partly by increased exploration and partly by the deferral of some pro-
767. Phillips, BNOCshare sale runs out of time, The Times (London), Mar. 26, 1981, at 19, col.
4.
768. Stothard, How high-speed Lawson stirred up Energy, The Times (London), Oct. 21, 1981, at
12, col. 1.
769. The Times (London), Jan. 3, 1980, at 13, col. 2.
770. See supra notes 611-14 and accompanying text.
771. See, ag., The Times (London), May 20, 1980, at 6, col. 3 (statement of David Howell in the
House of Commons, May 19, 1980).
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duction. No cutbacks on output would be considered until the Varley
Assurances ran out. Mr. Howell preferred to ensure that each reservoir
was developed to its fullest potential. He also intended to consider delay-
ing the approval of development plans for fields discovered after 1975. 771
The fact that the government had initially overestimated North Sea
output considerably eased its overproduction problems. For instance, it
had been estimated that production in 1980 would be around 80 to 85
million tonnes, and that 85 to 105 million tonnes would be produced in
198 1.775 But in actuality, only 80.5 million tonnes were produced in
1980, and 89.4 million tonnes were produced in 1981.776 This shortfall
was largely caused by technical development problems.
In the wake of Mr. Howell's announcement, the Department of En-
ergy began evaluating development plans to ascertain whether any plan
could be suitably delayed. In December 1980, BNOC, the operator of
the Clyde field, was directed to postpone its development programme for
two years.77 7 However, no further development plans were delayed dur-
ing Secretary Howell's incumbency because no other such plans were
submitted.778
3. Exploration Policy
The government's removal of BNOC's operating privileges and its
intention to privatise the state oil company's upstream division were sig-
nificant elements in the government's initial attempts to encourage
UKCS exploration. But possibly the most important strand in the De-
partment of Energy's strategy was the seventh round of licensing held in
1980 in response to the UKOOA's repeated pleas for more offshore
acreage.
The discretionary allocation system used in former rounds was con-
tinued with an interesting innovation in the method of application for
some of the blocks. In keeping with government policy, the requirement
that BNOC be offered a fifty-one percent or more equity stake in each
license was dropped and substituted with a requirement that BNOC be
given the right to buy more than half of the petroleum produced for a
774. Id.
775. Hirst, How fast should the oilflow?, The Times (London), July 18, 1980, at 21, col. 3.
776. U. K. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 534, at 22.
777. See Forster & Ziliman, supra note 600, at 85.
778. Stewart-Gordon, Hamish Gray's Elegy, WoRLD Om, June 1982, at 45, 45.
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given licence.7 79 The exploration programme was retained as the British
equivalent to the American bid variable. But, as in the past, other criteria
continued to play an important role in the selection process. 780
Pursuant to the old block-specific fashion, eighty blocks were origi-
nally offered, primarily in frontier areas such as the West Shetlands, the
English Channel, and the Southwestern Approaches."' At slightly more
than five million acres, this round of licensing constituted nearly twice
the area offered for OCS leasing in 1980.782 At the UKOOA's prompt-
ing, however, a further huge region of well explored, but highly lucrative
acreage in the northern North Sea was opened to corporate nomination
upon payment of a five million pound fee per block.783 The object of this
offering was to elicit industry input into the licensing process,784 a goal
which strongly resembled the purpose behind the MMS's Call for Infor-
mation. An auction of the blocks, for which there was precedent in the
fourth round, was ruled out because, like earlier administrations, the
government was afraid that competitive bidding might serve to exclude
the smaller British independent oil companies.785
The experimentation employed in the seventh round proved to be a
noteworthy success. One hundred and twenty-five applications, more
than that received for any other round, were submitted786 for ninety-five
blocks, forty of which were in the nominations area.78 7 Nomination pay-
ments totalled £210 million.7 8
The major reason for the success of the seventh round was indus-
779. See Hirst, Oil companies given more scope in licensing of 90 North Sea blocks, The Times
(London), May 2, 1980, at 19, col. 3.
780. The other criteria may be summarised as follows: (A) technical competence, (B) access to
adequate financing, (C) the applicants' previous performance in meeting licence obligations,
(D) exploration already undertaken by the applicant in the area presently being applied for, (E) the
contribution the applicant has, or plans to make, to the British economy, with special emphasis on
balance of payments and industrial growth, (F) whether a foreign applicant's government treats
British companies equitably, (G) whether the applicant has provided, or intends to provide, British
industry full and fair opportunity to compete for orders of goods and services, (H) whether the
applicant is prepared to work with independent trade unions, and (I) the applicant's record in train-
ing employees for offshore work. Gazette Notice of 4th July 1980, reprinted in OIL AND GAS LAW:
THE NORTH SEA EXPLOITATION 3.1915-.1916 (H. Henderson ed. 1982).
781. U. K. DEPT OF ENERGY, supra note 534, at 32.
782. See MINERALs MGMT. SERvicE, supra note 549, at 16.
783. Millard, supra note 545, at 428.
784. Later reports indicated that "[t]he seventh round was popular because, for the first time,
companies were able to nominate which blocks they wanted." THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 16, 1980, at
71, 71.
785. The Times (London), May 2, 1980, at 19, col. 3.
786. Hirst & Gunn, Gambling on a Gusher, The Times (London), Dec. 8, 1980, at 17, col. 1
787. Id.
788. Id., Dec. 17, 1980, at 15, col. 4.
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try's eagerness to explore new areas. Other influential factors included
the still rising price of oil (the official price for North Sea crude eventu-
ally rose to a high in 1981 of $39.25 a barrel789) and a government sup-
ported plan to build a gas-gathering pipeline which would provide a 572
mile long grid for the Scottish oilfields.7 ° This plan would have allowed
for the speedier and more profitable development of discoveries in the
northern North Sea, because the wasteful flaring of gas and its associated
tight government supervision would no longer be necessary. However,
the plan, which would have been one of the single most costly British
investments of the century, was scrapped in September 198 1.7
4. Taxation
The government's oil taxation policy had been consistently geared to
the reduction of PSBR. The burgeoning North Sea fiscal payments oc-
curred simultaneously with the Conservatives' election to power. In
1978-79, the total tax collected from offshore operations stood at a mod-
est £562 million.792 By 1979-80, PRT payments alone swelled to £1436
million and rose to £2410 million in 1980-81.793 Mr. Leon Brittan, Chief
Secretary to the Treasury, acknowledged the fiscal importance of North
Sea oil in May 1981: "Without these revenues, government borrowing
would be higher and so interest rates would be higher, within a given rate
of monetary growth. '79 4
In 1979, when the United Kingdom embarked upon its worst reces-
sion in forty years and when oil company profits, as well as the price of
oil, continued to rise, it again became inevitable that the British govern-
ment would attempt to maximise its economic rent. Before the enact-
ment of the Finance Act (No. 2) 1979,71' Geoffrey Howe, the Chancellor
of the Exchequer, said, "I have judged [the rises] now against a back-
ground of recent rises in the price of oil. On that basis... proposals for
giving the Government more revenue from the North Sea are now fully
justified. '796 To the disappointment of the oil industry, the Conserva-
789. See id., June 6, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
790. Ready for the match, THE EcONOmS, June 21, 1980, at 71, 71.
791. Williams & Morris, New Treasury doubts threaten gas pipeline, The Times (London), Sept.
5, 1981, at 17, col. 2.
792. U. K. DEPT OF ENERGY, supra note 534, at 20.
793. Id.
794. See Williams, Frittering Away the North Sea's Riches, The Times (London), Dec. 14, 1981,
at 15, col. 3.
795. Finance Act (No. 2), 1979, ch. 47.
796. Salomons, A Promise Fulfilled, 19 EuR. TAX'N 231, 232 (1979).
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tives opted for a rise in PRT to sixty percent 797 and a reduction in the
PRT allowances planned by the previous Labour government.798 Capital
allowances were reduced from 175 to 135%,199 and the oil allowance was
reduced from ten million to five million tonnes per field.80°
The 1980 budget raised PRT from sixty to seventy percent8"1 and
required that in addition to regular PRT payments, further sums of fif-
teen percent of estimated PRT liability for the next year would be paya-
ble with respect to any chargeable year. 0 2 The advance payments were a
device designed to improve Treasury cash flow. Labour regarded these
changes as inadequate, 0 3 while some Conservatives saw them as too
radical. 8 4
In any event, the oil industry suffered a much more severe jolt with
the unveiling of Secretary Howe's "mini-budget" of November 1980.
Specifically, it was announced that the budget of 1981 would provide for
a Supplementary Petroleum Duty (SPD) to be introduced for a trial pe-
riod of eighteen months.80 5 The Finance Act 1981806 stipulated that
SPD was to be levied at twenty percent against oil company revenues
derived from UKCS oilfields.8 7 This levy was to be used in conjunction
with the PRT, the corporation tax, and royalties. Unlike the PRT and
the corporation tax, which were chargeable against net profits, the SPD
was charged against gross revenues and hence functioned as a type of
royalty.808 It was estimated that the new duty would raise £1000 million
in its first year and result in some fields being taxed at a marginal rate of
ninety percent.809 A further important change in PRT was also made.
The Oil Taxation Act 1975 was amended to the effect that for any
chargeable period, profits in excess of fifteen percent of capital expendi-
797. Finance Act (No. 2), 1979, ch. 47, § 18(1).
798. Salomons, supra note 796, at 232.
799. Finance Act (No. 2), 1979, ch. 47, § 19.
800. Id. § 21.
801. Finance Act, 1980, ch. 48, § 104.
802. Id. § 105.
803. The Times (London), May 22, 1980, at 6, col. 1.
804. One Conservative, Mr. Trevor Skeet, remarked that government fiscal policy was "about
extracting as much as they could from the oil companies." The Times (London), June 5, 1980, at 6,
col. 4.
805. United Kingdom." Public Spending Cuts and Tax Increases in the Forecast for 1981-82, 20
EuR. TAX'N 373, 373 (1980).
806. Finance Act, 1981, ch. 35.
807. Id. § 122(2).
808. Id. § 122(1).
809. During the passage of the Finance Bill, Mr. Philip Shelboume, the new chairman of
BNOC, indicated that a 90% tax on profits was unreasonable and that a 50% rate would be more
appropriate. The Times (London), Mar. 15, 1981, at 20.
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ture would be chargeable to PRT. l°
Prior to the passage of the Finance Act 1981, the UKOOA lobbied
intensively against the new changes in oil taxation. They offered to put
up £1000 million for the Treasury if the Chancellor would consider other
methods to increase tax collection. Mr. Howe refused the offer, but in
March 1981 he did invite the oil companies to discuss with Treasury
officials how, given the objectives of government and industry, the UKCS
fiscal regime could be profitably altered.81x Meanwhile, the oil tax provi-
sions of the Finance Act 1981 made the UKCS one of the most highly
taxed oil provinces in the world. As a result, the fiscal regime began to
reflect the same unfortunate consequences anticipated by the United
States Department of the Interior with regard to royalty and net profits
bidding.812 Thus it was the taxation system, in conjunction with the fall-
ing price of oil, which caused the complete dearth of development appli-
cations between December 1980 and March 1982.813
In the context of the United Kingdom, the SPD had a particularly
adverse impact. Unlike the PRT, the SPD allowed for no capital expen-
diture relief.814 This meant that the smaller, more technically complex
fields, which were likely to be the mainstay of future UKCS production,
would become subject to SPD once they attained profitability. Conse-
quently, the SPD effectively discouraged the development of such fields.
Shell and Esso, for instance, in April 1982, decided to defer development
of the Tern and Eider fields, estimated to contain 140 and 120 million
barrels respectively.815 Given that very few new discoveries were likely
to be larger than 150 million barrels, 816 the actions of Shell and Esso
highlighted a potentially deleterious new trend.
A further problem caused by the government's tax policy in this
initial period was that constant fiscal alterations made offshore invest-
ment planning very difficult. Speaking before the House of Commons
Select Committee on Energy, Mr. Bexon of BP stated: "How can we
make investment decisions when we don't know what Government fiscal
810. Finance Act, 1981, ch. 35, § 114(1).
811. The Times (London), Mar. 24, 1981, at 7.
812. See Pumping the Oilmen, TH ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 1981, at 62, 63 ('Oil companies will
curb production to limit tax payments, and explore for more elsewhere.").
813. See Hirst, Has Sir Geoffrey gone too far?, The Times (London), Mar. 23, 1981, at 17, col. 3.
814. See Finance Act, 1981, ch. 35, § 124. There was, however, an oil allowance of 500,000
metric tonnes of oil per field. Id.
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policy is going to be?" '17 The lack of stability in the oil taxation system
introduced a type of uncertainty into the British oil regime which paral-
leled the confusion engendered by the dropping of OCS lease sales in the
United States.
5. Conflicting Goals
As discussed previously, the goals of the Conservative government
in relation to offshore oil tend to conflict. 8 8 Where there is such a con-
flict, one or more goals must eventually take priority over the rest. In the
Conservative administration's first three years of office, the maximisation
of revenue and the desire to maintain control over oil supply took prece-
dence over other objectives. Nevertheless, significant steps, such as the
abolition of BNOC's privileges and the holding of a market-oriented sev-
enth round of licensing, did much to encourage private sector explora-
tion. The high levels of taxation markedly slowed new developments, as
the oil companies preferred to invest their funds in less expensive explor-
atory drilling.819 The steadily worsening economic situation was the
main reason for the alterations in the fiscal system. As predicted, unem-
ployment increased, and British industry stagnated.820 A side effect of
large North Sea oil exports was the creation of a strong pound, which
made it difficult for the rest of British industry to compete in overseas
markets.821 The British economy had seen no large-scale privatisations
by the autumn of 1981, as the general caution on the part of the Conserv-




In September 1981, Mrs. Thatcher made several substantial changes
in her cabinet. A number of ministers who had dissented against the
government's monetarist stance were removed, and more sympathetic
newcomers were introduced. Mr. David Howell was transferred to the
Department of Transportation, and Mr. Nigel Lawson was made the new
Secretary of Energy. 23 The latter's appointment eventually led to a rear-
817. Morris, BPjoins in attack on North Sea policy, The Times (London), July 23, 1981, at 19,
col 2.
818. See supra text accompanying notes 696-97.
819. See The North Sea-how it helps Britain's economy, SHELL U.K. REPORTS, July 9, 1981.
820. Lady with any lamp?, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 10, 1981, at 11, 11.
821. Williams, supra note 794, at 15, col. 7.
822. See The great Tory knock-down sale, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 24, 1981, at 54, 54.
823. Mr Thatcher repairs the dykes for the rainy season, THE ECoNoMIST, Sept. 19, 1981, at 61.
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rangement of priorities in Conservative energy policy. Despite the fact
that Mr. Lawson has since been elevated to the Chancellorship of the
Exchequer, the UKCS oil and gas regime remains in the mold that he
fashioned. With Mr. Lawson's influence in mind, the consideration of
the four leading issues outlined above will now be continued with refer-
ence to the period from autumn 1981 to the present.
1. BNOC
After occupying the post of Secretary of Energy for little more than
a month, Mr. Lawson announced to the House of Commons on October
19, 1981, that the government intended to introduce legislation which
would allow for the privatisation of BNOC's operating arm, the
privatisation of BGC's offshore oil interests, the dismemberment of
BGC's monopoly on gas supply, and other changes. The new Energy
minister described his proposals as being "nothing less than the privatisa-
tion of the North Sea.""82 BNOC's oil trading role, however, was to
continue unchanged.825 At the time of these proposals, BNOC had the
largest exploratory acreage of any corporation operating in the UKCS.826
It also had interests in nine oil fields (six of which were then producing)
which accounted for about seven percent of known North Sea reserves
and which were estimated in 1981 as being worth between £1500 to
£2000 million. 2 7 BGC owned interests in five producing offshore fields,
worth an estimated £1000 million and accounting for about 0.5% of off-
shore reserves.828
The legislative embodiment of Mr. Lawson's proposals was intro-
duced into Parliament on December 17, 1981.829 The speed with which
the denationalisation scheme was advanced was largely motivated by the
government's funding needs, which became ever greater as the recession
worsened. 830 An additional impetus was provided by the Secretary of
Energy's "deep gut belief in the benefits of bringing private capital into
the publicly owned industries."'8 3 1 The government rejected the asset
824. Hill, £1,500m sale of State's North Sea Oil, The Times (London), Oct. 20, 1981, at 1, col. 2;
see also Energy Act, 1976, ch. 76, § 8 (establishing BGC's monopoly rights over the supply of natu-
al gas).
825. See The Times (London), Oct. 20, 1981, at 1, col. 2.
826. Id. at 6, col. 1.
827. Id.
828. Id. at 21, col. 3.
829. The Times (London), Dec. 18, 1981, at 1, col. 3.
830. Id., Oct. 20, 1981, at 6, col. 1.
831. Stothard, supra note 768, at 12, col. 1.
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auctioning approach to privatisation. On November 10, 1981, Mr. Law-
son had stated in the House of Commons that BNOC's upstream assets
would be used to create a new British oil company, to be called "Britoil,"
the shares of which would be floated on the stock markets. 32 Secretary
Lawson had promised that the new corporation's articles of association
would provide for a substantial measure of state control.833 Though the
government would own less than fifty percent of the shares, the state
would have the option of appropriating majority powers, when, for ex-
ample, it came to the election of directors.8 34 This feature was intended
to ensure that ownership of the company would not fall into unaccept-
able hands.8 35 The projected plans also called for the creation of a "BP"
type relationship between state and corporations. 836 It was additionally
envisaged that Britoil would be formed and operational by autumn 1982,
with shares being offered to the public by the end of 1982.37 The loan
stock scheme, never having been implemented, was quietly dropped. 838
The Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act 1982839 received the Royal Assent
on June 28, 1982. Sections 1 and 2 of the Act give BNOC the power to
organise, register, and dispose of the shares of subsidiaries whose princi-
pal object is the exploration, development, and production of petro-
leum.8" However, no such shares can be disposed of without the
concurrence of the Energy Department and the Treasury.841 Section 3
provides that the Secretary of Energy can direct BNOC to use the powers
granted to it in sections 1 and 2.842 Any proceeds of equity disposals are
payable to the Secretary.84 3 The Secretary may also, with the agreement
of the Treasury, request that the shares of any such subsidiary be trans-
ferred to him or his nominee.8" Although the National Oil Account was
abolished,845 it was provided that in the future, BNOC must, on the re-
quest of the Secretary of Energy and with the approval of the Treasury,




836. Id.; see supra notes 499-501 and accompanying text.
837. The Times (London), Dec. 18, 1981, at 1, col. 3.
838. Williams, North Sea Oil public share plan scrapped, The Times (London), Dec. 5, 1981, at
17, col. 2.
839. Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act, 1982, ch. 23.
840. Id. §§ 1, 2.
841. Id. § 1(2).
842. Id. § 3.
843. Id. § 3(3).
844. Id. § 3(4), (7).
845. Id. § 8(1).
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pay its annual profits into the fund in which all taxes are paid, the Con-
solidated Fund.8' Sections 9, 10, and 11 create the same types of powers
and duties for BGC as sections 1, 2, and 3 do for BNOC. 7 Section 12 of
the Act ends BGC's monopoly over gas supply." 8 These statutory provi-
sions were to be the machinery which would denationalise BGC's off-
shore oil fields.
As planned, the upstream assets of BNOC were transferred to
Britoil, a company registered in Scotland, in August 1982.849 At that
point, only the timing of the sale was left to be resolved. The renegoti-
ation of BNOC's participation agreements did not prove to be as difficult
as had been previously thought. Nevertheless, major obstacles were en-
countered in the creation of Britoil and its subsequent flotation.
First, several problems arose over the issue of fair market value for
Britoil shares. Beginning in the summer of 1981, oil prices tumbled from
a high of $39.25 to $30.00 per barrel by March 1982.850 North Sea oil
lost fifteen percent of its value in February 1982 alone. Because of an
oversupply of about three million barrels a day on the world market, the
recession, and conservation, a glut of oil began to build up.851 The re-
sulting value of oil equities provoked Mr. Edward Rowlands, a Labour
spokesman on energy, to comment, "nobody in his right mind would try
to sell a large number of oil shares in the current situation." '852 Against
this background, a related and similarly vexing "fair market" difficulty
arose over the best method of selling the Britoil portfolio. The February
15, 1982 sale of Amersham International, a state-owned manufacturer of
radioactive isotopes, provided a valuable lesson in the possible pitfalls of
privatisation. Shares that were originally offered at 142p each were over-
subscribed twenty-three times, and within two days shares were selling at
192p.8 83 The Amersham sale was regarded as the type of debacle to be
avoided if at all possible in the much larger Britoil flotation. In addition,
Labour introduced further uncertainty into the flotation by pledging to
renationalise Britoil upon regaining office and thereafter to grant com-
pensation on the basis of "non-speculative" profits.85"
846. Id. § 5(1), (3).
847. Id. §§ 9-11.
848. Id. § 12.
849. The Times (London), Nov. 12, 1982 (Britoil prospectus supplement), at I, col. 1.
850. Id., Mar. 2, 1982, at 15, col. 1.
851. Id., Mar. 3, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
852. Id., July 27, 1982, at 4, col. 1.
853. The Times (London), Feb. 27, 1982, at 13, col. 3.
854. See, e.g., id, Nov. 11, 1981, at 4, col. 6 (statements of Labour M.P.'s Merlyn Rees and
Anthony Benn in the House of Commons, Nov. 10, 1981).
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It was also suggested by some economic analysts that Britoil would
be a badly structured oil company."' Despite the fact that Britoil would
probably make substantial profits from its producing fields, it was
claimed that the company's cash flow would be paltry compared with
that of its rivals." 6 Britoil's technical and management ability were
doubted, and it was asserted that BNOC's massive exploratory commit-
ments accruing from the fifth and sixth rounds would be an anchor
around Britoil's neck."5 7 It was further argued that Britoil, unlike the
major oil companies, would be a purely North Sea corporation, exposed
to the toughest operating conditions and highest fiscal regime in the
world858
These objections and hazards proved to be so serious that Secretary
Lawson felt compelled to promise that the Britoil flotation would be de-
ferred till 1983 in the event that market conditions indicated that an ade-
quate price for the shares could not be obtained."5 9 In the meantime and
by virtue of the Britoil Limited (Transfer of Shares) Order 1982,16° the
Secretary of Energy exercised his right, pursuant to section 3(3) of the
Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act,86' to have Britoil's shares transferred and
vested in him.86 The Order became effective on November 1, 1982.863
One share, known as "the special preference share," was transferred to,
and vested in, the Solicitor to the Treasury.", This special share, which
may not be owned by anyone but a Minister of the Crown or the Solicitor
to the Treasury, was the means by which the government chose to insti-
tute future state controls over the ownership of Britoil.8 65 In certain
circumstances described in Britoil's articles of association, the special
shareholder is given the power to veto the director's appointments or
dismissals and to outvote other shares at general meetings.866
It was announced that the sale, which would constitute fifty-one per-
cent of Britoil's ordinary shares (the state planned to retain ownership of




859. Id., Aug. 26, 1982, at 8, col. 2.
860. Britoil Limited (Transfer of Shares) Order, 1982 STAT. INST. No. 1415.
861. Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act, 1982, ch. 23, § 3(3).
862. Britoil Limited (Transfer of Shares) Order, 1982 STAT. INST. No. 1415, Reg. 2.
863. Id. at Reg. 1.
864. Id. at Reg. 2.
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the other forty-nine percent), would be held on November 19, 1982.67
Because of the fear that the fixed price system would lead to a repeat of
the Amersham flotation and its attendant speculative gains, applications
for shares were invited on a cash tender basis. A minimum tender offer
or "striking price" was fixed at 215p, and the flotation was underwritten
to the extent of £548 million. 68 The Secretary of Energy hoped that the
sale would attract as many small investors as possible, thereby spreading
ownership of Britoil widely among the British population. An incentive
for such investors was provided by the proviso that shareholders with
2000 shares or less of Britoil equity would receive a one for ten scrip
issue on the elapse of three years.3 69 Despite this incentive only twenty
to thirty percent of the ultimate subscribers proved to be small inves-
tors. 70 The underwriting of the shares proved to be a wise decision, as
only seventy million of the 255 million shares on offer were subscribed.8 7'
Naturally, these results proved to be a political, if not a financial, embar-
rassment for the government.8 72
Secretary Lawson had stated in the House of Commons on Novem-
ber 10, 1982 that "[tihe method of disposal of British Gas Corporation
shares for its oil interests has not yet been decided., 873 Nevertheless, the
BGC denationalisation process had been well underway before these re-
marks. Mr. Lawson had previously directed BGC in August 1982, by
virtue of the British Gas Corporation (Disposal of Offshore Oilfield In-
terests) Directions 1982,874 to begin preparatory work for the disposal of
its offshore fields.875 Further directions were given in 1983.876 In No-
vember 1983, a corporation known as "Enterprise Oil" was formed to
take over BGC's equity shares in the five producing UKCS fields and
some of BGC's offshore exploration interests. 77 The new Secretary of
867. The Times (London), Nov. 11, 1982, at 1, col. 3.
868. Id., Nov. 13, 1982, at 13, col. 1.
869. The Times (London), Nov. 12, 1982 (Britoil prospectus supplement), at X, col. 1; see id.,
Nov. 11, 1982, at 1, col. 3.
870. P. CAMERON, supra note 541, at 170.
871. House of Commons Library Research Div., Privatisation, Background Paper No. 140, at 9.
872. The Times (London), Nov. 20, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
873. Id., Nov. 11, 1982, at 4, col. 4.
874. British Gas Corporation (Disposal of Offshore Oilfield Interests) Directions, 1982 STAT.
INsr. No. 1131.
875. U. K. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 534, at 12.
876. See British Gas Corporation (Further Disposal of Offshore Interests) Directions, 1983
STAT. INsr. No. 1096; British Gas Corporation (Transfer of Shares of Subsidiaries) (No. 2) Order,
1983 STAT. INST. No. 1667.
877. See Dafter, Company to make a Texan envious, The Financial Times (London), Oct. 26,
1983, at 8, col. 4.; Lawson, Enterprise Oil-Builtfrom the top down, The Financial Times (London),
June 18, 1984, at 10, col. 1.
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Energy, Patrick Walker, appointed immediately after the Thatcher gov-
ernment's reelection in June 1983, decided that the public should be of-
fered 100% of Enterprise Oil's shareholding.878 The special share
concept, however, was once again used to prevent the new oil company
from being taken over. As in the Britoil sale, the offering was underwrit-
ten, and minimum tenders were fixed at 185p a share.87 9
The sale of Enterprise Oil's shares was held on June 27, 1984. Ap-
plications were received for 66.4% of the portfolio.88 0 But very shortly
after the sale closed, the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation announced that it
had, through nominees, applied for about forty-nine percent of the of-
fered stock.88 ' In view of the fact that the government intended to en-
sure that Enterprise Oil would function as an independent British oil
company, Secretary Walker exercised his discretion to reject the applica-
tions of Rio Tinto Zinc's nominees.88 2 Accordingly, the final result of the
flotation was that only about a quarter of the shares were subscribed. 883
The wisdom of underwriting the offering had once again been made
apparent.
BNOC's marketing role remained unchanged. The state corpora-
tion went through a difficult period in the spring of 1983 when it seemed
for a time that the price of oil might collapse on the world markets. The
government exerted its influence on BNOC to ensure that falls in the
price of North Sea crude followed, rather than led, OPEC decision-mak-
ing. It was believed that this policy would contribute a measure of stabil-
ity to the oil market.884  BNOC, however, still had to buy its
participation oil on long-term contracts and sell on a short-term basis.
During the crisis of 1983, overwhelming pressure was brought to bear on
BNOC by its customers-the largest of whom is the Gulf Oil Corpora-
tion-to cut the price of North Sea crude as a means of enabling refin-
eries to be run more efficiently.88 The experience of spring 1983
indicated that in times of conflicting perspectives over the appropriate
price of oil, BNOC, with its dominant role in marketing, remained vul-
nerable to the varying demands of customers who could simply refuse to
purchase supplies of oil regarded as being overpriced. In testimony
878. The Times (London), June 22, 1984 (Enterprise Oil prospectus supplement), at 2, col. 1.





884. The Times (London), Apr. 15, 1983, at 17, col. 4.
885. Id., Feb. 4, 1983, at 17, col. 2; see id., Apr. 20, 1983, at 19, col. 4.
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before the House of Commons Select Committee on Energy shortly after
the oil markets had stabilised, many oil companies, including Esso, BP,
and Shell, cited BNOC's awkward position in times of market fluctuation
as a reason for changing the state oil corporation's trading function or
even abolishing BNOC altogether." 6 But Mr. Lawson defended BNOC
by noting that it had done much to avert a catastrophic fall in oil prices
and that the supply controls which the corporation provided were as nec-
essary as ever."87 Mr. Patrick Walker, the new Secretary of Energy, also
regards State oil trading as being essential to the national interest.888
2. Depletion Policy
The year 1982 saw a redefinition of the government's policy on de-
pletion. Secretary Lawson regarded oil and gas forecasting as an inher-
ently uncertain exercise:
I do not see the Government's task as being to try and plan the future
shape of energy production and consumption. It is not even primarily
to try and balance UK demand and supply for energy. Our task is
rather to set a framework which will ensure that the market operates
in the energy sector with a minimum of distortion.... a89
The House of Commons Select Committee on Energy's report on
depletion policy, which was published on May 18, 1982, closely con-
formed to the government's views.890 Mr. Lawson let it be known in
June that the government would not, barring an emergency, use produc-
tion controls until the end of 1984 at the earliest.8"' After endorsing
most of the Select Committee's report in July 1982, the Conservatives
further promised that there would be no more delay in the approval of
development plans, and that even in an emergency there would not be an
excessive use of reserve powers that would otherwise seriously disrupt
corporate economic expectations. 92
These pledges have been fulfilled despite the fact that a rapidly fall-
ing rate of consumption (there was a fall of seventeen percent in 1980-81)
has widened the margins of overproduction. 93 In 1983, Shell U.K. Lim-
886. The Times (London), Apr. 20, 1983, at 19, col. 4.
887. Id., Apr. 15, 1983, at 17, col. 4.
888. Id., Feb. 21, 1984, at 4, col. 7.
889. Address by Nigel Lawson, Secretary of State for Energy, at the Fourth Annual Interna-
tional Conference of the International Association of Energy Economists, Churchill College, Cam-
bridge, England (June 28, 1982).
890. U. K. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 534, at 13.
891. Id.
892. Id.
893. See Address by Nigel Lawson, supra note 889.
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ited acknowledged that "during the recent uncertainty the Government
could well have intervened to protect oil prices, and its own revenues, by
imposing short-term production controls. Any less conservative govern-
ment almost certainly would have done so." '94 OPEC, of course, has
been continuously, but unsuccessfully, attempting to persuade the Con-
servatives to reduce UKCS production so as to ease the world glut.' 95
Finally, it should also be noted that apart from its market-oriented pol-
icy, a major reason why the government rejected any form of depletion
control was because of the short-term effect that such action might have
had on Treasury receipts.896
3. Exploration Policy
Although offshore exploratory activity significantly increased in
1981 because of acreage licensed in the fifth and sixth rounds, the
UKOOA claimed that in 1982 between two-thirds and one-half more oil
was being produced than was being discovered. 97 In view of what the
government saw as the continuing need for the opening up of the UKCS
for exploration, an eighth round of licensing was announced in Septem-
ber 1982.98 In Mr. Lawson's words, "[t]he main objectives for the
Round are to open up areas where no exploration drilling has yet been
undertaken and to provide further opportunities for exploration in the
established [southeastern UKCS] gas province." 9 9 It was hoped that the
abolition of BGC's monopoly powers over gas supply, which were associ-
ated with low UKCS gas prices, would provide an incentive for the oil
industry to explore for gas again. There had been virtually no natural
gas exploration since the early 1970's.11 Thirty-eight blocks were to be
offered in the gas-rich southern North Sea. One hundred and thirty-one
blocks were to be drawn from virgin frontier territory such as the Forth
Approaches, the Bristol Channel, the northwest Atlantic, and areas off
northeastern England. All of the foregoing were to be licenced in the
normal discretionary fashion. A further fifteen blocks in the northern
North Sea were to be auctioned. As in the seventh round, it was ex-
pected that blocks in this region would draw the greatest industry inter-
894. Shell U.K. Ltd., The Future of BNOC 3 (1983) (internal policy paper).
895. See The Times (London), Nov. 1, 1983, at 21, col. 7.
896. THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 1982, at 35, 36.
897. Stewart-Gordon, supra note 778, at 45.
898. See U. K. Dep't of Energy, Press Notice (Sept. 23, 1982).
899. Id.
900. The Times (London), Oct. 8, 1982 (special report), at 25, col. 7.
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est." 1 At a total of 184 blocks offered, the eighth round was the largest
licence offering since the fourth round in 1971-7212 and invited applica-
tions for about twice as much offshore acreage as did all of the 1982
American OCS lease sales put together.9 03 The licensing criteria, which
included BNOC's fifty-one percent purchase right, were similar to those
stipulated for the seventh round.9 4
From the perspective of natural gas, the eighth round was a definite
success, but interest was low in the frontier and oil-prospective areas." 5
Only half of the auction blocks were bid on, and these blocks attracted
high bids totalling a mere thirty million pounds.906 The sixty applications
which were received involved 100 corporations in consortia,9 7 consider-
ably less than the 125 applications received in the seventh round.908 The
two main reasons behind the round's relative failure were the fiscal re-
gime, which was not significantly lowered in the 1982 budget, and the
falling price of oil. But another reason may have been that many smaller
companies simply had enough acreage left to explore from the seventh
round.
Despite the lack of interest in the eighth round, exploratory drilling
increased on the UKCS during 1982. Sixty-eight exploration wells were
drilled in that year, as compared with forty-nine in 1981.909 In light of
the 1983 budget, there was a further substantial increase in exploration in
1983.910 And, in 1984, the Conservatives decided to make more acreage
available through a ninth round of licensing.911 According to Mr. Alick
Buchanan-Smith, Minister of State for Energy, the main objective of the
ninth round was "to maintain and increase the momentum of exploration
drilling which reached record levels in 1983."' 912
The 195 blocks offered in the ninth round encompassed a wide vari-
901. See U. K. Dep't of Energy, supra note 898.
902. U. K. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 534, at 32.
903. About 11,000,000 UKCS acres were offered in the eighth round. The five OCS sales of
1982 offered a total of 7,637,122 acres. MINERALs MGMT. SERVICE, supra note 549, at 16.
904. Gazette Notice, Sept. 24, 1982 (inviting applications for the eighth round of licensing).
905. The Times (London), Jan. 20, 1983, at 13, col. 1.
906. Id. Eventually, 70 blocks were licenced as a result of the eighth round. U.K. DEP'T OF
ENERGY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OnL GAS REsOURCEs OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 1985, at 40
(1985).
907. The Times (London), Jan. 20, 1983, at 13, col. 1.
908. U. K. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 534, at 32.
909. Id. at 34.
910. Letter from Alick Buchanan-Smith, Minister of State for Energy, to the Author (Apr. 4,
1984).
911. Gazette Notice, July 1984 (inviting applications for the ninth round of licensing).
912. U. K. Dep't of Energy, Press Notice (Feb. 15, 1984).
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ety of terrain. The 182 blocks licenced pursuant to the previously used
discretionary basis drew 117 applications from 134 companies. 913
Licences were awarded in May 1985 for eighty of these discretionary
blocks. 914 The fifteen northern North Sea blocks which were auctioned
attracted thirty-two bids, with total high bids adding up to more than
£120 million.915 Thirteen auction blocks were eventually licenced. All
applications, as in the seventh and eighth rounds, gave BNOC the right
to purchase fifty-one percent of any production.9 16
Some of the ninth round frontier acreage, such as the Rockall and
Faroes Troughs, was in hostile deepwater territory. Three incentives
were introduced to encourage exploration of such areas. First, blocks
classified as being "Deep Water Frontier Areas" were given an initial
term of eight years, with a further term of forty years.91 7 Interestingly, a
parallel practice has developed in the United States, where the Secretary
of the Interior has recently used his powers pursuant to section
8(b)(2)(B) of the OCSLAA918 to grant ten-year lease terms for Gulf of
Mexico tracts deeper than 400 meters.919 Second, blocks in the Rockall
and Faroes Troughs were offered in pairs, and up to two pairs of blocks
were allowed to be incorporated in a single production licence.920 Fi-
nally, applications for non-auction blocks in mature areas were consid-
ered in light of "the extent to which the applicant is prepared also to
apply for, and explore, a block or blocks listed under frontier areas...
particularly in depths of water exceeding 200 metres.i 921
Fewer companies were involved in consortia than might have been
expected because the Department of Energy decided to allow no more
than ten licence equity owners per licence granted.922 This decision was
designed to encourage the participation of the large companies, whose
finance and expertise were seen as necessary for the exploration and de-
velopment of hostile frontier acreage.9 23 An unfortunate result, however,
has been that small companies have found more difficulty in obtaining
licence shares. Also, the wording of the criteria for granting licences in
913. U. K. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 906, at 40.
914. THE OILMAN WEEKLY NEWSLE=TR, May 25, 1985, at 1, 1.
915. Id.
916. Gazette Notice, supra note 911, at para. 4.
917. Id.
918. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(2)(B) (1982).
919. See New lease terms should encourage drilling, OFFSHORE, Aug. 1984, at 51, 51.
920. Scottish Economic Planning Dep't, North Sea Oil Information Sheet (June 1984).
921. Gazette Notice, supra note 911, at para. 8(e).
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the ninth round occasioned charges of unfairness being levelled at the
British government by the EEC Commission.92 4 According to the EEC
Commission, "the UK Government was discriminating against firms
based in other [EEC] member states and was pursuing a 'Buy British'
policy,5925 a policy that would be contrary to the Treaty of Rome. The
Commission has since dropped the case, but only after assurances from
the Department of Energy that the alleged unfairness would not be re-
peated in the next round. This does not, however, mean an end to discre-
tionary licensing, since the Commission's objections were directed only
at certain wording, not at the discretionary system itself.
926
The eighth and ninth rounds can be seen in proportional terms as
more dramatic than the Watt program. About ten million acres were
licenced as a result of the two rounds. Taking into account the fact that
the OCS is about eight times as large as the UKCS, an equivalent Ameri-
can program would have to lease eighty million acres. In all but the
seventh round, however, it has been the size of the blocks, rather than the
procedure for their nomination, which has caused the comparison of the
British system with areawide leasing.
4. Taxation
In response to Chancellor Howe's invitation in early 1981 to discuss
better methods of taxing UKCS oil and gas, the UKOOA drew up a
proposed taxation system which would meet Treasury cash targets, but
also reduce disincentives for development. The government refused to
accept the UKOOA plan, however. 927 Although the Finance Act
1982928 introduced a number of changes in oil taxation, the new levels of
tax remained almost as high as previously. The SPD was abolished as of
January 1, 1983,929 but the PRT was increased from seventy to seventy-
five percent.930 Another factor compensating for the abolition of SPD
was the introduction of the Advance Petroleum Revenue Tax
(APRT). 931 The APRT was to be charged at the rate of twenty percent




927. Stewart-Gordon, supra note 778, at 45.
928. Finance Act, 1982, ch. 39. See generally The 1982-83 Budget" A Budget for Industry--And
for Jobs Says the Chancellor, 22 EuR. TAX'N 95, 95-96 (1982).
929. Finance Act, 1982, ch. 39, § 132(2).
930. Id. § 132(1).
931. Id. §§ 13942; see id. at sched. 19.
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on any participator's gross profits for any given chargeable year, but was
to be offsetable against future PRT liability.932 Here, the intention was to
tax fields which, because of the various PRT reliefs, paid no PRT. As
with SPD, however, there was an oil allowance of 500,000 metric tonnes
of petroleum per field per year which was not chargeable.933 The APRT
took the place of the system of advance payments of PRT instituted by
the Finance Act 1980. 93  The government further expected that the oil
taxation provisions of the Finance Act 1982 would reduce UKCS reve-
nues by seventy million pounds during 1983 to 1984.131
The high rates of oil taxation may well have been necessary from the
government's point of view, but they certainly had a deleterious impact
on the pace of oil field development. The Department of Energy blamed
the lack of development on the falling price of oil, but in fairness it must
be borne in mind that even when oil prices had hovered around the fif-
teen dollars per barrel mark in the late 1970's, there had been no lack of
development commitments. Furthermore, depressed oil prices were not
preventing costly foreign offshore developments from taking place.
936
By 1983, economic indicators began to show that the United King-
dom was slowly pulling out of the recession,937 thereby giving the Treas-
ury an incentive to lighten the offshore fiscal burden. Development plans
slowly began to be submitted again in 1982,938 but the non-development
era of 1980-82 had ensured that UKCS production would experience a
substantial reduction after 1986. 939 Faced with this certainty and a pos-
sible termination of British self-sufficiency, the Conservatives acted in
1983 to enhance the UKCS's attractiveness as an oil province. The main
aim was to encourage the development of small, remote, deepwater fields.
However, the proposals did very little to ease taxation on existing
production.
On March 15, 1983, Chancellor Howe, in his budget speech, out-
932. Id. § 139(2).
933. Id. § 141(1).
934. See Finance Act, 1980, ch. 48, § 105. The system of advance payments instituted by § 105
of the Finance Act, 1980 was abolished, as of June 30, 1983, by the Finance Act, 1982, ch. 39,
§ 139(6).
935. The Times (London), Mar. 10, 1982, at 9, col. 4.
936. Stewart-Gordon, supra note 778, at 45.
937. Britain: The Economy Before the Budget, Tm ECONOMIST, Feb. 26, 1983, at 65, 65-66.
938. Stewart-Gordon, supra note 778, at 45.
939. Energy Options for the U.K., an address by LM. Raisman, Chairman and Chief Executive
of Shell U.K. Ltd., to the Fellowship of Engineering, at the Institution of Electrical Engineers Hall,
London 7 (Mar. 23, 1983).
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lined the details of the government's new UKCS fiscal system.940 The
APRT was to be phased out with respect to all chargeable fields over a
three and a half year time period. The rate would be fifteen percent from
July 1, 1983 to December 31, 1984, ten percent from January 1 to De-
cember 31, 1985, and five percent from January 1 to December 31,
1986.14 ' The rate would thereafter be abolished for all old fields already
in production94 and immediately abolished for all new fields coming on-
stream.943 While the termination of the APRT, much sought after by the
UKOOA, improves corporate cash-flow,94 it does nothing to reduce cor-
porate liability to the PRT itself. It was estimated that the APRT
changes would cause the Exchequer to lose fifty million pounds in 1983-
84.9 4 5
The main provisions designed to facilitate expansion of UKCS oil
development related to royalties, the PRT oil allowance, and a new relief
related to exploration and appraisal costs. In March 1983, it was an-
nounced that legislation which abolished royalties on all future fields
would be introduced by the Secretary of Energy.94 "Future fields" were
defined as those fields whose development plans were approved after
April 1, 1982. 9'7 The only future fields not covered by this exemption
were fields in the mainly gas-bearing Southern Basin. 948 ' The government
thought that fields in this area had a reasonable guarantee of profitability
under the old system.9 49 An enabling statute which contained the pre-
ceding changes with regards to future fields, the Petroleum Royalties
(Relief) Act 1983,950 was passed into law shortly before the end of 1983.
The Finance Act 1983951 returned the PRT oil allowance for future
fields to pre-1979 levels. As a result, each future oil field could produce
up to 500,000 metric tonnes of PRT-exempt petroleum per year.952 Such
940. The Times (London), Mar. 16, 1983, at 9, col. 2.
941. Inland Revenue, Press Release 2 (Mar. 15, 1983).
942. Id.
943. Letter from John Wakeham M.P., Minister of State at the Treasury, to G. Williams of the
UKOOA (Mar. 15, 1983) (outlining budget proposals, particularly the abolition of APRT, intended
to reduce tax burdens on UKCS oil production).
944. Id.
945. Inland Revenue, supra note 941, at 5.
946. U. K. Dep't of Energy, Press Notice No. 30 (Mar. 15, 1983).
947. Finance Act, 1983, ch. 28, § 36.
948. U. K. Dep't of Energy, supra note 946; see also Finance Act, 1983, ch. 28, § 36(2)(a) (sets
out geographic descriptions of fields excluded from the exemption).
949. See Letter from John Wakeham, supra note 943, at 2.
950. Petroleum Royalties (Relief) Act, 1983, ch. 59.
951. Finance Act, 1983, ch. 28.
952. Id. § 36(1)(a).
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exemptions were limited to a cumulative total of ten million metric ton-
nes.953 Lastly, it was provided that licence participators lacking an ap-
proved development plan would be able to use only exploration and
appraisal expenditure incurred with respect to only a UKCS field to off-
set PRT chargeable against any licence.9 4 This was also a change
which the UKOOA had strongly lobbied for955 and is one of the few
instances where losses or expenses incurred outside a given field may af-
fect the rate of PRT within the field.
Chancellor Howe's package provided a major stimulus for develop-
ment without losing a great deal in short-term Treasury receipts. It was
estimated that the changes would cost roughly £800 million from 1983-
87,956 a mere 1.8% of estimated UKCS revenues likely to be derived dur-
ing this period.9 7 Very few of the future fields will be producing at peak
capacity by 1987. But in terms of future development, the provisions are
extremely significant, as their overall effect will be to reduce the average
rate of tax on future fields from over seventy to sixty percent.95 8 The new
exploration allowance may be especially useful in encouraging the utilisa-
tion of the expensive technological equipment which will be required to
explore uncertain and inhospitable areas such as the Rockall Trough.
The 1984 budget further assisted the offshore industry by reducing
the marginal rate of tax and royalties on existing fields from 89.5 to
85.78%. 9 For offshore reservoirs designated as "future fields," which
thus benefit by the Petroleum Royalties (Relief) Act 1983,9 ° the margi-
nal tax rate was cut from 88 to 83.75%.961 The 1985 budget did not
make many modifications in oil taxation, but did provide a source of
annoyance for the oil industry when the anticipated enhanced oil recov-
ery expenditure relief did not materialise.962
The tax changes of 1983 and 1984 have been instrumental in creat-
ing the new exploratory boom and a welter of developmental activity on
the UKCS. In 1983, seventy-seven exploration wells were drilled and
twenty-one significant discoveries were made.963 By comparison, in
953. Id. § 36(1)(b).
954. Id. at sched. 8, part. I, § 5A.
955. See Letter from John Wakeham, supra note 943, at 2.
956. Id. at 3.
957. The Times (London), Mar. 30, 1983, at 19, col. 3.
958. Letter from John Wakeham, supra note 943, at 2.
959. Inland Revenue, Press Release I (Mar. 13, 1984).
960. Petroleum Royalties (Relief) Act, 1983, ch. 59.
961. Inland Revenue, supra note 959, at 1.
962. See THE OxuMAN WEEKLY Nawn=Errn, Mar. 23, 1985, at 5.
963. U.K. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 906, at 41.
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1982, sixty-eight exploration wells were drilled, and nine significant dis-
coveries were made.9 A report by the UKOOA in 1982 showed that in
recent years thirty discoveries had been left undeveloped.965 Undoubt-
edly, the fiscal regime and lower oil prices contributed to this lack of
development. But after the 1983 budget, development plans were sub-
mitted with respect to many of these fields, and, in 1984, one hundred
and six exploration wells and seventy-six appraisal wells were begun.966
This represents the highest rate of exploratory activity yet. With the
drilling of 108 development wells, 1984 represents the fourth most inten-
sive year of development drilling in UKCS history.967 Fifteen develop-
ment plans were approved in 1984, and six were approved in the first two
months of 1985 .968 The Department of Energy estimates that a further
thirty-three development plans may be proposed during 1985.969
5. Towards a Market-Oriented Regime
The second stage of Conservative oil policy saw the creation, slowly
in some sectors, of more truly market-oriented economic conditions. It
has been speculated that the Cabinet changes of 1981, initially at least,
paved the way for this occurrence, especially in relation to the flotation
and privatisation of Britoil, BNOC's former operating arm. The rejec-
tion of depletion controls reflected the government's suspicion of energy
forecasting and its strong reluctance to be seen as directly inhibiting pri-
vate sector business. The policy of high taxation constituted a form of
involuntary depletion, but taxation-induced field deferrals came too late,
by and large, to reduce the hump of overproduction which the United
Kingdom is currently experiencing.
The Conservatives responded to industry requests to hold licensing
rounds every two years with the seventh, eighth, and ninth rounds. The
opening up of the UKCS for exploration, viewed as essential by industry,
has also been seen as necessary from the government's perspective in
terms of continuing British self-sufficiency and providing an oil-flavored
boost to the British economy. But for most of Mr. Lawson's tenure as
Energy Secretary, the Cabinet felt compelled to maximise short-term rev-
enues to cope with a bleak domestic situation, a policy decision which
964. Id.; U. K DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 534, at 33.
965. The Times (London), Mar. 30, 1983, at 19, col. 6.
966. U. K. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 906, at 42.
967. Id. at 43.
968. Id.
969. Id. at 12.
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could only be carried out at the expense of ongoing offshore develop-
ment. The 1983 budget, with its cleverly devised assistance for "future
fields," served to advance the goals of boosting future offshore produc-
tion and enhancing further oil-related economic activity without signifi-
cantly diminishing short-term Treasury cash flow. The 1984 budget was
a further important contribution.
VI. THE COMPARATIVE SuccEss OF RECENT AMERICAN AND
BRITISH OFFSHORE OIL DEVELOPMENT
A. The Shaping of American and British Offshore Oil Strategies
A major goal of Mr. Reagan's and Mrs. Thatcher's policies has been
to encourage free enterprise exploration and development of offshore ar-
eas. Secretaries Watt, Clark, and Hodel have faced formidable opposi-
tion in the implementation of this objective, an experience not shared by
their British counterparts. It is submitted that the American constitu-
tional system, the powers of the states, the special interest groups, and
the substantive American offshore oil laws make the formulation and
pursuit of a coherent OCS energy strategy difficult to achieve. Great
Britain has a comparable constitutional system; "states" in the form of
the English, Scottish, and Northern Irish nations; special interest groups;
and oil and gas laws. However, these factors have not thwarted Con-
servative oil policy. Instead, difficulties in British energy policy have,
until very recently, originated from the fact that the government's goals
have sometimes contradicted one another.
1. The Political Systems
It would take a major political coup for either of the two main
American political parties to gain control of the Presidency, the Con-
gress, and the Supreme Court. For the time being, there is a Republican
President, and it is generally accepted that the present Supreme Court is
conservatively inclined. With regard to the latter, it should be noted that
the two OCS cases appealed to the Supreme Court during Mr. Reagan's
period of office, Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation9"' and
Secretary of the Interior v. California,9 ' were won by the administration.
The Congress, however, has proved to be a stumbling block for the pres-
ent administration's expedited leasing program. Because the President is
970. 454 U.S. 151 (1981).
971. 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
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separately elected and is not nominated by the Congress, it is impossible
to guarantee that the executive and legislative branches will agree on all
policy issues. Though there is currently a Republican Senate, the House
of Representatives has had a Democratic majority for many years. Mak-
ing matters more complex is the fact that the conflict between institu-
tions is not confined to the normal situation of differing political control.
Party discipline in the United States is much less strict than in the United
Kingdom, and, with respect to OCS issues, congressmen and senators are
as likely to act on state interests as on party dogma. An excellent exam-
ple of the latter occurrence has been the endorsement and defense of the
Watt program by Congressman John Breaux and Senator Bennett John-
ston, both Louisiana Democrats.972 Conversely, a determined Congress
can effectively disrupt presidential plans or even substitute policy and
legislation of its own. The appropriations moratoria, which have caused
grievous disruption to the OCS program, demonstrate the influence
which the Congress wields over American energy policy.
Like the United States, the United Kingdom has a tripartite form of
government composed of the Prime Ministry, the Parliament, and the
Superior Courts. However, there is only one effective UKCS decision-
maker, the Cabinet, which, in recent times, has become increasingly
dominated by the Prime Minister. In Great Britain, the executive level
of government is nominated by the Parliament, so there could never be,
for example, a Conservative government with a Labour majority in the
House of Commons. Thus the executive level is always of the same polit-
ical hue as the parliamentary majority. Political loyalty is very strong,
and it is extremely rare for M.P.'s from the government's own party to
vote with the opposing party. Consequently, a British government which
has a reasonable parliamentary majority can virtually pass whatever leg-
islation it desires. The Labour government of 1974-79 was one of the few
recent British administrations which had a very narrow majority, a ma-
jor reason why Scottish nationalism loomed so large as an issue during
that era. The 1979 and 1983 elections gave the Conservative party large
majorities, and there has never been any doubt since 1979 that the vari-
ous strands of United Kingdom energy policy would meet with the ap-
proval of Parliament. The British courts have as yet played no
significant role in the development of United Kingdom oil and gas law,
as there has been only one British oil and gas case, Earl of Lonsdale v.
972. See Kelly, Furor building over OCSprogram, DRILLING CONTRACTOR, Sept. 1982, at 66,
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Attorney General 973
In the American political system, the semiautonomous states often
perceive themselves as having different interests than the federal author-
ity. A particularly good example is California, which sees Californian
OCS development as a threat to its natural beauty, wildlife, fishing indus-
try, tourism, and indigenous heavy crude oil industry. California and
other states have used their influence in Congress, and their ready access
to the courts via the OCSLAA and the environmental statutes, to at-
tempt to alter federal oil and gas policy. Any OCS leasing program is
likely to attract the opposition of at least some of the coastal states.
Through Congress and statute, the states have a powerful say in federal
oil and gas decisions.
The United Kingdom is a parliamentary and royal union composed
of four nations: Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and England. None
of these nations retains a separate legislature, although Northern Ireland
did have an assembly which dealt with purely Northern Irish affairs till
1972. Stormont, as it was called, functioned in a manner comparable to
an American state legislature.974 As noted previously, Scotland came
close to seceding from the United Kingdom in the mid-1970's. 9"
Although it had great influence on the previous Labour government,
Scotland has had no say in Mrs. Thatcher's policies, energy-related or
otherwise. In March 1979, a referendum was held to ascertain whether
the Scots were in favor of Labour's scheme for legislative devolution, the
Scotland Act of 1978.976 This Act stipulated that the proposed Scottish
legislature would not be set up unless at least forty percent of the Scottish
electorate voted in its favor.9 77 While a majority did in fact vote in favor
of the legislation, the required "super majority" was not obtained. With
the failure of the home rule plan, the SNP withdrew its support for Mr.
Callaghan's administration, thereby precipitating the May 1979 general
election. In that election, the SNP vote collapsed and left the party with
only two parliamentary seats. Scotland returned a solid Labour major-
ity, but it was of no avail in the now Conservative dominated Parliament.
Scotland made little impact on UKCS energy policy during the last Par-
liament and saw no significant nationalist revival in the early 1980's, as
the last election again elected a majority of Labour M.P.'s. Conse-
973. [19821 3 All E.R. 579 (Ch.).
974. P. DALTON & R. DEXTER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9-10 (1976).
975. See supra notes 598-602 and accompanying text.
976. Scotland Act, 1978, ch. 51; see Assembly Substitute, THE ECONOMIST, June 23, 1979, at 25.
977. Scotland Act, 1978, ch. 51, § 85.
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quently, autonomous areas of the United Kingdom, unlike the American
coastal states, have posed no recent opposition to centrally decided off-
shore oil and gas policy.
2. Environmentalists
It has already been noted how important a role the American en-
vironmentalist lobby has played in the history of the OCS. Environ-
mentalist efforts, allied with those of the states, were instrumental in
causing the failure of Project Independence and the other leasing pro-
grams of the 1970's. Like the states, environmentalists have affected en-
ergy policy through Congress and the courts. A testimony to their
activity in the former is the fact that over seventy-four different sets of
regulations govern OCS oil and gas operations.97' While the inhabitants
of southern states, such as Oklahoma, Texas, and Louisiana, have
learned to live with the oil industry, New Englanders and Alaskans, for
example, off whose shores much of America's future supplies may lie, are
suspicious of OCS development. The Santa Barbara blowout greatly
contributed to making the American public, particularly the inhabitants
of the frontier states, "oil conscious." This oil consciousness has natu-
rally tended to be heightened by the fact that the most lucrative OCS
areas outside the Gulf of Mexico-the Californian, Alaskan, and North
Atlantic OCS-have shorelines of magnificent natural beauty, varied
wildlife, and thriving tourist and fishing industries which could possibly
be damaged by oil and gas extraction. The OCSLAA and the environ-
mental statutes have afforded the environmentalists and others numerous
grounds on which to challenge DOI policy in the courts. These chal-
lenges have been less successful in recent years, but the environmentalist
role in the leasing processes remains a major one.
It would be quite wrong to suppose that there are no environmental-
ists in the United Kingdom. The British environmental groups which do
exist, however, have directed their efforts at nuclear power and nuclear
weapons, rather than at the oil industry. Though the North Sea has also
had a major blowout in the Ekofisk field in the Norwegian Continental
Shelf 9 7 9 and though the North Sea as a fishing ground is several times as
productive as the Georges Bank,9 80 the British have never experienced
978. AM. PET. INST., SHOULD OFFSHORE OIL BE PUT OFF LMTS? 127 (1984).
979. See Hancock & Stone, Liability for Transnational Pollution Caused by Offshore Oil Rig
Blowouts, 5 HAsmNs INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 377, 389 (1982).
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the same "oil consciousness" as their American counterparts. There has
never been a sizeable onshore oil industry in the United Kingdom, and
all but one of the presently developed fields (the exception being the Bea-
trice field in the Moray Firth) are many miles offshore and cannot be
seen from land. These factors account for the fact that the British public
has little conception of the oil and gas activity being carried out on the
UKCS. But, as evidenced by Shell Oil's attempt to drill exploratory
wells in the English New Forest, public reaction to growing onshore ex-
ploration has been much less quiescent.98' The weak economic situation
and the comparative success of the offshore oil industry have also con-
tributed to the absence of continental shelf environmentalism in the
United Kingdom. Few groups in Britain wish to inhibit the development
of an industry which brings many jobs and much investment in times
when both are scarce.
3. Legal Constraints
The law relating to American OCS oil and gas, a product of the
agitation and compromises of the late 1960's and the 1970's, clearly bears
the marks of state and environmentalist influences. The OCSLAA and
environmental statutes such as NEPA, which afford private parties
standing to sue, provide a considerable and intricate mass of procedural
and policy direction for the Secretary of the Interior. The procedural
requirements, such as the drawing up of EIS analyses, CZMA consis-
tency determinations, and the extensive state, local government, and pub-
lic consultation of the OCSLAA processes, have made the administration
of OCS leasing and operations more difficult. The practical effect of the
continuous elaboration of congressional goals has been a limitation in the
Secretary of the Interior's discretion and the encouragement of litigation.
For instance, section 18 of the OCSLAA, with all of its exhaustive desid-
erata, makes the preparation of a five-year leasing program an unenviably
difficult task.9 82
United Kingdom oil and gas law is very different. Up until 1971,
statutory British oil law was comprised only of sections 2 and 6 of the
PPA.983 These provisions anticipated a discretionary licensing system
whose rules could be made up by the relevant ministers as they went
along. With regard to licensing, there is not at present a single statutory
981. The Times (London), Jan. 15, 1982, at 3, col. 2.
982. 43 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982).
983. Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, ch. 36, §§ 2, 6.
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or regulatory provision which requires the Secretary of Energy to consult
with anyone before he announces UKCS licence offerings. However,
since 1980, the Department of Energy has made a practice of inviting
suggestions and input from potentially interested parties such as fisher-
men.984 There are no British equivalents to NEPA, CZMA, or ESA, and
many of the landmarks of the OCSLAA have no counterparts in the
British system. Moreover, there are no statutory statements of goals, no
five-year leasing plans, no authorisations of bidding systems, no CEIP's,
and no information programs. There is, however, a Fisherman's Com-
pensation Fund, which is financed by the UKOOA and administered by
representatives of fishermen's organisations. 985 The Fund, which is simi-
lar to its United States equivalent in that it is not intended to displace
tort liability, provides compensation for damage to gear or boats, and for
lost fishing time.9 86 Additionally, model clause 20 grants to the Secre-
tary of Energy the power to require licensees to retain special funds suffi-
cient to "discharge any liability for damage attributable to the release or
escape of petroleum in the course of activities connected with the exercise
of rights granted by this licence." 987 Where OCS law tends to give the
Secretary of the Interior duties and responsibilities, UKCS law tends to
give the Secretary of Energy discretion. Britons have never, save once,
attempted to use the courts to question the Department of Energy's deci-
sions.988 Britain's oil regulations simply do not encourage them to pur-
sue such a course.
B. Implementation of the Reagan and Thatcher Offshore Agendas
It is because of the preceding constitutional, political, socioeconomi-
cal, and legal factors that the United States has found difficulty in imple-
menting its energy policy. This is not necessarily a criticism of the
American system, for it would be quite impossible to govern such a huge
country with a British-style unitary Parliament. The rise of environmen-
tal and other special interest groups and the passing of environmental
legislation and the OCSLAA may or may not have been an appropriate
reaction to the Santa Barbara blowout, the Arab oil embargo, and Pro-
984. Letter from Mr. Francis M. Reid, Dep't of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland, to the
Author (Aug. 23, 1984).
985. Id. The fund is an administrative, not a regulatory or statutory, creation.
986. Id. The fund is used to compensate the injured party only when the oil-related damage
cannot be attributed to a particular company.
987. Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1982 STAT. INST. No. 1000, sched. 5, cl. 20(9).
988. See Earl of Lonsdale v. Att'y General, [1982] 3 All E.R. 579 (Ch.); see also supra note 520-
27 and accompanying text (discussing Earl of Lonsdale).
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ject Independence. The point sought to be made is that the American
political system, societal pressures, and the offshore oil laws have all al-
lowed for effective opposition to the Department of Interior's OCS
policies.
Contrastingly, there has been no such opposition during the
Thatcher administration. Incoherencies in the Conservatives' energy
strategy have come from the contradictory nature of some of the govern-
ment's goals. In what was identified above as Stage One of their North
Sea oil policy,93 9 the Conservatives discouraged new developments, yet
hoped for a development dependent stimulus to the British economy in
the form of new orders for rigs, pipelines, and other technology. Until
recently, the onerous UKCS taxation regime effectively prevented the de-
velopment of new fields at a time (1982-83) when these fields were needed
to prolong British self-sufficiency, another prime Conservative objective.
Though the present government is one of the most market-oriented in
recent times, it has not dispensed with BNOC's trading arm, which is
seen as essential to British control of supply. These paradoxes are largely
attributable to Britain's economic position. Depletion policy became rel-
evant only because the United Kingdom, alone among major Western
industrialised countries, has a current oil surplus. The taxation regime
was necessary because of the weakness of British industry and the corre-
sponding legacy of unemployment. BNOC's oil supply controls were re-
tained because of the United Kingdom's membership in the competitive
EEC, a major consumer of oil, and because of the nation's dependence on
a predominantly foreign-based oil industry possessing an unknown de-
gree of loyalty to Great Britain.
Presently, the worst conflicts in United Kingdom energy policy have
been resolved. Though the government still has a large North Sea "tax
take," taxation is no longer obstructing development, the key to future
self-sufficiency. In view of the current need to boost production, deple-
tion policy has also been dropped. However, BNOC's oil trading role is
likely to be a lasting feature of the UKCS regime.
It would be erroneous to assume that Republican OCS objectives
have in no case conflicted. Nevertheless, the policies of Secretaries Watt,
Clark, and Hodel have consistently demonstrated a harmony not evident
for long periods in the United Kingdom. Since 1981, the Department of
the Interior has consistently encouraged exploration and production at
the expense of OCS bonuses. OCS oil taxation, which is composed of
989. See supra notes 716-822 and accompanying text.
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both corporate and windfall profits taxes, takes, on average, about sixty
percent of the oil companies' gross profits. This is one of the lowest rates
in the world and, unlike the British system, has not tended to discourage
offshore developments.990 It will be recalled, however, that Secretary
Watt was committed to the expansion of OCS leasing without adverse
environmental effects. Theoretically, there tends to be a conflict between
the maximisation of exploration and development and the preservation of
the environment. It was really this conflict which caused the failure of
the American OCS programs of the 1970's. Thus the achievement of
Secretary Watt was the creation of an expedited leasing program that
contained market-oriented, streamlined regulations complying with the
OCSLAA and the stringent environmental statutes.
The United Kingdom's fear that the multinational oil corporations
might develop the UKCS without necessarily benefitting Britain is a con-
tinuing justification for the discretionary licensing system and BNOC.
Because the oil industry in America is overwhelmingly domestic and
leads the world in oil expertise and technology, the United States does
not feel the same need for such governmental controls. Moreover, the
United States has prepared for oil supply shortages or other emergencies
with the Federal Strategic Petroleum Reserve.99' It should be noted,
however, that the OCSLAA does give the federal government some lev-
erage over OCS oil and gas. 992 BNOC, even in its present limited mar-
keting role, remains as one of the major differences between the
American and British oil regimes. It is difficult to conceive of an Ameri-
can national oil company, although, interestingly, the idea has recently
been suggested in Congress in the form of the Federal Oil and Gas Cor-
poration Act.9
93
1. The Watt Program
An analysis of the recent success of the United States and the
United Kingdom in carrying out their offshore objectives will now be
undertaken. With regard to the United States first, it will be recalled that
Mr. Watt's goals were: (1) to maximise OCS exploration and produc-
990. See New Economics call for change, OFSnHoR., May 1984, at 79, 79; The Times (London),
Sept. 7, 1982, at 19, col. 2.
991. Holcombe, Strategic Petroleum Reserve, 26 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 457 (1977-78).
992. See Vass, A Comparison of American and British Offshore Oil Development During the Rea-
gan and Thatcher Administrations, 21 TuisA LJ. 23, 43-54 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Vass I].
993. H.R. 20, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). See generally Williams, Oil and Gas and the Federal
Lands, 1976 UTAH L REv. 507, 516-17 (discussing the idea of a state-owned American corporation
participating in oil and gas developments).
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tion; (2) to inventory the federal offshore; (3) to boost the American
economy; (4) to create market-oriented conditions; and (5) to protect the
environment. 994
a. Exploration and production
Scrutiny of the pace of leasing and subsequent exploration casts
much light on the success of the first two goals. Perhaps a little surpris-
ingly, the 1.9 million OCS acres leased in 1982 actually represents a drop
of about 500,000 acres when compared to the 1981 figure.995 But, start-
ing with the advent of areawide leasing during the Mid-Atlantic lease
sale of April 1983, the first five areawide sales leased just over 6.5 million
acres.9 96 Most of the areawide leases have been awarded in the West and
Central Gulf of Mexico, largely because other sales, such as the Mid and
South Atlantic and the Eastern Gulf, have been in less lucrative areas
and because the 1984 Southern Californian and North Atlantic offerings
were postponed. The MMS's Alaskan lease sales have helped to open up
that state's largely unexplored frontier territory, but California and Mas-
sachusetts have resisted expedited leasing, and around eighty-five percent
of the Californian OCS is currently out of bounds. Litigation and the
appropriations moratoria have ensured that there have been no North
Atlantic lease sales during the present government's incumbency. The
three Californian sales which were held involved substantial tract dele-
tions, and the fourth, Lease Sale 80, has been deferred. In view of the
fact that the Californian OCS and the Georges Bank are perceived as
highly prospective, DOI should regard its leasing record in these areas as
a comparative failure.
The efforts of Secretaries Watt, Clark, and Hodel have induced sig-
nificant exploratory drilling in many parts of the OCS. A focal point of
activity has been the Gulf of Mexico, where 253 exploration wells-more
than twice the UKCS equivalent 997-- were drilled in 1983.998 The rate of
offshore drilling in the Gulf continued to increase in 1984. For instance,
sixty-three mobile rigs, compared with thirty-one in June 1983,999 were
exploring the Texan OCS in June 1984. During the first six months of
994. See Vass I, supra note 992, at 57-58.
995. MINERALS MGMT. SERVICE, supra note 549, at 12-13.
996. Id.
997. One hundred and twenty-eight exploration and appraisal wells were commenced in the
UKCS during 1983. Letter from Mr. M. Hay of the Inland Revenue Policy Division (Oil) to the
Author (July 9, 1984).
998. LeBlanc, Drillers target central Louisiana tracts, OFFSHORE, July 20, 1984, at 45, 46.
999. Market Trends, OursHoRF, July 5, 1984, at 5.
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1983, twenty-four discoveries similar to the small fields now being found
in the North Sea were reported in the Gulf of Mexico. 1 O The two West-
ern and Central Gulf areawide sales of 1983 doubled the number of
leases held by industry in the Texan and Louisianian OCS, and the April
1984 sale further contributed to corporate holdings. It is this vast
amount of acreage, much of it in deepwater areas on the periphery of
previous developments, which is fueling the rapid pace of mobile rig ex-
ploration in the Gulf of Mexico.
Although exploration rates have been far less spectacular in the Cal-
ifornian OCS, it is in this sector that the most promising OCS discovery
has been located. The Point Arguello field, probably about half the size
of the British Forties field and a tenth of the size of Prudhoe Bay, was
discovered by Chevron in 1982.1°1 Twelve exploratory wells were
drilled in 1981, and the number increased to nineteen in 1982.1"2 But
exploration has declined since then, and in April 1984 there were only
nine exploratory rigs operating in the Californian OCS.' ° 3
Industry attempts to find an OCS equivalent to Prudhoe Bay in the
Alaskan offshore are proving to be as great a challenge to oil technology
as the development of the North Sea. The exploration of some of the best
prospects off northern Alaska (i.e., the Diapir field) have necessitated the
creation of man-made islands. 1" In such tough terrain it is inevitable
that fewer wells will be drilled, but even so the level of less than ten wells
drilled per year for the past number of years is lower than might have
been expected."° 5 Despite the recent, costly failure of Sohio's Mukkluk
well and Arco's forty-four million dollar dry hole in the Gulf of Alaska,
the rate of exploratory drilling is clearly on the increase, and a single
commercial find (of which there has yet been none) would in all likeli-
hood be the signal for a massive expansion.
1006
Six exploratory wells were begun in the Atlantic OCS in 1982, but
like all previous efforts, they proved to be fruitless."' 7 As in Alaska
there have been a number of very expensive dry holes, the latest having
1000. LeBlanc, New leases spur Gulf rig activity, OFFSHORE, Jan. 1984, at 51, 51.
1001. The World Offshore, OFrsHoRE, Apr. 1984, at 11.
1002. MINERALS MGMT. SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
OIL AND GAs LEASING AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1982, at 10
(1983).
1003. See Offshore Drilling to Increase in 1984, OFFSHORE, May 1984, at 96, 105.
1004. $100 million island is US record, OFFSHORE, Jan. 1984, at 36, 36.
1005. Only three exploration wells were drilled in 1982. MINERALS MGMT. SERVICE, supra note
1002, at 11.
1006. Rintoul, Drillers Seek Alaska Supergiant, OFFSHORE, Jan. 1984, at 29.
1007. MINERALS MGMT. SERVICE, supra note 1002, at 12.
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been drilled in 6448 feet of water by Shell in the Baltimore Canyon."'
b. The OCS inventory
When taken together, the preceding record of recent OCS explora-
tion reveals that the Reagan policies have certainly been successful in
encouraging the inventorying of the Gulf of Mexico. The success of the
goal of expanding exploration in the frontier OCS areas, however, has
been much less convincing. California and Alaska, still relatively pris-
tine, retain considerable future potential. And, despite the solid record
of previous failure, the oil industry still regards the North Atlantic OCS
as possibly hydrocarbon-bearing. Unfortunately, the leasing moratoria
must be regarded as casting doubt on the efficacy of the expanded leasing
program outside the already mature Western and Central Gulf of Mex-
ico. There can be no exploration or discoveries in the frontier OCS with-
out the availability of large amounts of lease acreage. Even after five
years of the Reagan administration, only three percent of the total OCS
wells drilled since 1954 have been drilled outside the Gulf of Mexico, and
eighty-seven percent of the Gulf wells have been drilled in the Loui-
sianian OCS."° 9
a Socioeconomic impacts and environmental protection
It is submitted that Secretary Watt's offshore oil regime has success-
fully created market-oriented operating conditions: the five-year pro-
gram helped to open up the OCS to the oil industry, areawide leasing
now largely depends on industry for tract selection, and the bidding pro-
cess clearly relies upon the limits of corporate estimations of fair market
value. The federal offshore accounted for eleven percent of the United
States' domestic oil supply in 1983.1°10 Production has been on a slow
upturn since 1981, increasing from an average of 1.06 million barrels per
day in that year to 1.25 million barrels per day in 1983.1011 Much of this
increase can be attributed to an expansion of activity in the Gulf of Mex-
1008. See Shell, Chevron keep East Coast Alive, OFFSHoRE, Jan. 1984, at 47, 47.
1009. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1985: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appro-
priations-Part 5, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 472 (1984) (statement of Paul L. Kelly, Vice-President of
Industry and Government Relations, Rowan Companies, Inc., Houston, Tex.).
1010. Offshore Oil and Gas Oversight Before the Subcomm on Panama Canal/Outer Continental
Shelf of the Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 226-32 (1984) (statement
of C.B. Wheeler, Senior Vice-President of Exxon Co.).
1011. See Offshore crude, gas production increase, OFrsHonp, July 20, 1984, at 52, 57.
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ico. 0 12 No frontier oil has yet contributed to domestic production, but
given the long lead times involved this is not surprising. Obviously, the
OCS is still not as important to the United States as the UKCS is to
Britain. The United Kingdom offshore produced nearly twice as much
oil as the OCS in 1983, with an average daily rate of 2.27 million bar-
rels. 1 3 American oil imports steadily declined after 1981, and bottomed
out at less than four million barrels per day in early 1983 because of
conservation and the recession. 1014 The balance of payments bill for
1982 fell to sixty billion dollars. 015 But imports have recently risen
steeply again, and, by the beginning of 1984, the rate had gone back up to
over five million barrels a day, about a third of total consumption.1
0 1 6
The Watt program has meant a major boom for the differing seg-
ments of the offshore industry. By the summer of 1981, a fifty percent
expansion of the world's offshore drilling fleet had begun at a total cost
estimated to be in excess of twelve billion dollars.10 1 7  The American
geophysical fleet, which had carried out extensive surveying before the
approval of the current five-year plan, grew by more than forty percent in
this period. Contracts for more than $800 million worth of new supply
ships were awarded for completion before the end of 1983.1018 Service
and supply industries have spent about twenty billion dollars developing
equipment necessary for the exploration of frontier areas. 101 9 Expendi-
ture has been particularly heavy in the development and purchase of the
highly complex technology required for the Alaskan OCS. The recently
constructed Mukkluk Island, for example, cost over $100 million. 20
OCS leasing, however, has had even wider economic effects because the
American oil industry employs hundreds of thousands of people. In
1981, about 361,000 persons were employed both onshore and offshore in
California and Alaska alone, and fifty-one billion dollars was invested in
oil-related physical assets in these states.'0 21 In a recent study under-
taken by the Economics Department of Louisiana State University, it
1012. LeBlanc, New Leases spur Gulf Rig Activity, OFFSHORE, Jan. 1984, at 51, 51.
1013. See Offshore crude, gas production increase, supra note 1011, at 57.
1014. Remarks of Secretary William Clark to the United States Dep't of the Interior OCS Policy
Committee, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 12, 1984).
1015. MINmtIAS MGrr. SERviCE, supra note 980, at 101.
1016. Remarks of Secretary William Clark, supra note 1014.
1017. Palmer & Kelly, America's Five-Year Offshore Leasing Plan-Its Importance in Increasing
Domestic Petroleum Reserves and the Role of Industry in Its Development and Implementation, in 21
ExPLoRATION & ECON. OF THE PET. INDUSTRY 233 (1983).
1018. Id.
1019. AM. PET. INST., supra note 978, at 144.
1020. See $100 million island is U.S. record, OFFSHORE, Jan. 1984, at 36, 36.
1021. MiNERAtS MGMT. SERViCF, supra note 980, at 68.
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was found that in 1981 the offshore industry in both state and federal
waters employed 41,781 people in Louisiana. 10 22 The industry has also
provided indirect employment to another 85,000 persons in such sectors
as construction, maintenance, and business services. 10 23 Given the cur-
rent exploratory surge in the Gulf, it is reasonable to conclude that these
figures may reflect a lower level of oil-related employment than that
which currently pertains."° 4 It would, however, be wrong to suppose
that the economic benefits of offshore development have been confined to
oil-producing coastal states. Much of the steel used in building oil rigs,
for example, is made in Ohio and Pennsylvania. Engines powering the
rigs are made by Illinois and Michigan corporations. Highly specialised
drilling machines are made in such states as Nevada, Wyoming,
Oklahoma, and Utah.' 25 The offshore industry and its various contrac-
tual suppliers have, in their response to the Reagan administration's ex-
pedited leasing schedules, undoubtedly created an impact on the
American economy.
Another way in which the Watt program has assisted the American
economy is through the raising of OCS revenues for the federal Treasury.
Although the United States government rightly envisaged that the new
five-year plan would cause a drop in the average bonus bid per tract,
areawide leasing, with its high quality offerings, has helped to increase
federal receipts. From the viewpoint of the Treasury, revenues from the
OCS program compare favorably to the UKCS fiscal regime. In 1982,
OCS revenues, excluding taxation, totalled $7823 million. 1 26 By the end
of 1983, Britain had licenced a total of sixty-six million acres of the
UKCS,1°27 and the United States had leased about thirty million OCS
acres.128 Although UKCS production levels are also about double OCS
levels,' 9 in fiscal year 1982, the UKCS yielded the British Exchequer a
total, including tax, of £6452 million.10 30 With higher federal revenues
projected for 1983 and 1984, it is very probable that the American and
British offshore industries are presently contributing similar amounts to
public funds. American industry has not objected to the payment of
1022. AM. PEr. INsT., supra note 978, at 139.
1023. Id.
1024. Id.
1025. Id. at 143.
1026. MINERALS MGMT. SERVICE, supra note 549, at 16.
1027. AM. PET. INsT., supra note 547.
1028. MINERALS Mowr . SERvicE, supra note 549, at 16.
1029. See Offshore crude, gas production increase, supra note 1011, at 57.
1030. U. K. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 534, at 20.
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lease bonuses, which, once paid, are irrelevant to future investment deci-
sions. In sum, it appears that the expansion of lease sales has done much
to encourage wider participation offshore, particularly with regard to re-
cent Gulf of Mexico lease sales. It is the opinion of the industry periodi-
cal, Offshore, that "the areawide leasing concept ...is the principal
reason for the surge of independents into the offshore arena." 103 1 This
trend has further promoted exploration because smaller companies can-
not afford to delay the investigation of their lease equity. 1032
Turning to the last goal, environmental protection, there have been
no significant OCS oil spills or blowouts since 1981.1033 From all appear-
ances, it would seem that the offshore oil industry's safety and environ-
mental record has retained its credibility.
2. Conservative Goals
The UKCS goals of Mrs. Thatcher's Conservative government were:
(1) to encourage exploration; (2) to create a market-oriented operating
climate; (3) to use UKCS oil to boost the British economy; (4) to max-
imise oil revenues; (5) to attempt to prolong United Kingdom self-suffi-
ciency; and (6) to continue national controls over oil supply. 10 34
a Exploration
The two major factors in Conservative attempts to expand explora-
tion were the diminution and eventual termination of BNOC's operating
role and the holding of licensing rounds offering vast amounts of acreage.
It is estimated that the three latest licensing rounds will licence a total of
about fifteen million acres, probably more than the area that will be
leased under the present American five-year program. The licence crite-
ria of the ninth round have further assisted in the licensing of frontier
blocks. Industry was eager to gain acreage in the seventh round, but was
less interested in the eighth round because of the fiscal regime and the oil
glut. Alterations to the taxation system have stimulated exploratory
work, and the ninth round has been a considerable success. 10 35 Explora-
tion and appraisal drilling have increased every year since the Conserva-
tives came to office, reflecting both the success of the government's
1031. Redden, Operators pursue Gulfdeepwater tracts, OFaSHoRE, June 1984, at 48, 51.
1032. Id.
1033. AM. PET. INST., supra note 978, at 131.
1034. See supra notes 692-96 and accompanying text.
1035. See supra notes 966-69 and accompanying text.
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market-based policy and industry's need to discover new reserves. 10 36
More exploration and appraisal wells were drilled than ever before in
1983, and the level of activity in 1984 was even greater.10 37 Proportion-
ally far more exploration wells have been drilled on the UKCS than on
the OCS.
b. Market utilisation and other socioeconomic impacts
In the first stage of the present government's offshore strategy, the
possibility of the use of depletion controls, BNOC's continued existence
as an upstream oil corporation with important trading activities, and the
increasing fiscal burden detracted somewhat from the Conservative ad-
ministration's encouragement of free enterprise development of the
UKCS. By the end of the second stage, however, very favorable market
conditions were created, particularly with reference to the development
of future fields.10 13
UKCS oil has had a profound effect on the British economy over the
last five years. The UKCS puts Britain in the unique position of being
the only major Western power self-sufficient in oil. In view of the com-
parative weakness of British industry, Britain's oil-fueled balance of pay-
ments surplus is especially valuable. It is estimated that without North
Sea oil, there would have been a £5.8 billion balance of payments deficit
for 1983.1039 A report undertaken for the Institute of Fiscal Studies in
1981 by the economists Forsyth and Kay showed that "North Sea oil
adds, directly and indirectly, at least 10 percent to our national in-
come."" 4  In 1982, a year which saw the British jobless total rise to
around three million, it was calculated that unemployment would have
been about 700,000 higher without North Sea oil."° ' The offshore oil
industry currently employs 100,000 people directly, about 65,000 of them
in Scotland. 1o4 2 Capital investment has increased every year since 1979,
and a total of £8.5 billion was spent from 1979 through 1982.1°41 In
1982, oil-related spending amounted to twenty-five percent of United
1036. U. K DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 534, at 33.
1037. Letter from Mr. Alick Buchanan-Smith, supra note 910.
1038. United Kingdom Energy Outlook, Esso MAGAZINE (supplement), Winter 1983-84, at 7.
1039. SHEL. U.K. LD., THE NORTH SEA AND BRITISH INDUSTRY: THE NEW OPPORTUNITIES
7 (1984).
1040. Address by J.M. Raisman, supra note 715.
1041. SHELL U.K. LTD., supra note 1039, at 11.
1042. See Letter from The Rt. Hon. the Lord Gray of Contin, P.C., supra note 669.
1043. U.K. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 534, at 21.
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Kingdom industrial investment.' °44 It has been projected that nearly
sixty billion pounds will have to be spent if the UKCS is to provide an oil
supply sufficient to meet the United Kingdom's needs till the year
2000.1041 Over fifty billion dollars has already been spent in the explora-
tion and development of the UKCS. 'I These levels of spending can be
put into perspective by noting that Britain has a gross national product
an eighth of the size of America's and that the Apollo space program
cost $25.5 billion."° 7 North Sea oil is much more important to the
United Kingdom than OCS reserves are to the United States, as it is
easily the most significant industrial asset that Britain possesses. Present
policies do seem to be successful in using this asset to create wealth.
It was noted above that the British government has consistently at-
tempted, largely through the discretionary allocation licensing system, to
maximise United Kingdom involvement in UKCS development.'1 48
Although the Conservatives have been reasonably successful in pursuing
this economic goal, there have been some notable failures. In recent
years, some seventy percent of the contracts relating to offshore work
have gone to British companies."° 9 But United Kingdom firms, in 1982
for instance, only undertook twenty-nine percent of the exploration and
appraisal drilling. 10 50 There are still lamentably few British independent
oil companies.
The latest government initiative to improve British participation
was the Department of Energy's decision to include a new licence crite-
rion in the ninth round. In that round, heavy emphasis was placed on
the extent to which the applicant has involved, or plans to involve,
U.K. owned and controlled organizations in his exploration, develop-
ment, and production activities on the UK Continental Shelf through
the generation of new technology, the placement of research and devel-
opment contracts and the provision of opportunities for the design,
demonstration, and testing of products and techniques. 10 5 1
Commenting on this change, Mr. Alick Buchanan-Smith, Minister of
State for Energy, recently said, "[w]e are moving into new frontier areas
... [a] challenge [that] offers an opportunity for the U.K. to be a world
leader in offshore oil and to build up an industry which can be active for
1044. Id.
1045. Uthlaut, North Sea Prospects, Esso MAGAZwE (supplement), Winter 1983-84, at 11.
1046. ScOrriSu DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, supra note 587, at 3.
1047. Id.; see The English-speaking slump, THE ECONOMiST, Aug. 18, 1979, at 13, 13.
1048. SHELL U.K. LTD., supra note 1039, at 12.
1049. U.K. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 534, at 24.
1050. Id.
1051. Gazette Notice, supra note 911, para. 8(g).
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many years to come. 105 2
The importance of oil revenues to the Conservatives' economic
strategy has already been noted l10 3 In 1982, oil taxation swelled Treas-
ury cash flow by eight billion pounds, about ten percent of the govern-
ment's total tax receipts. 105 4 The level of receipts increased to nine
billion pounds in 1983.1055 The high tax rates of 1980-83 were very sig-
nificant in enabling the government to continue its monetarist policies in
the recession-laden months of the early 1980's.
The goals of Conservative oil policy have, by and large, been met.
The licensing rounds have, and are, opening up the UKCS to private
enterprise. There has been an impressive record of exploratory activity,
with numerous new discoveries. It is probable that these discoveries will,
with future finds, prolong British self-sufficiency into the 1990's. The
removal of BNOC's operating arm, a disavowal of depletion policy, and
reductions in taxation have done much to attract new offshore interest.
North Sea oil has been a vital influence in the British economy over the
last few years and appears to be ready to continue this role. Oil taxation,
as the Conservatives had hoped, has been a crucial factor in the adminis-
tration's financing, as the British government has doggedly retained its
controls over oil supply. Overall, it would appear that Mrs. Thatcher's
energy objectives have been more satisfactorily achieved than have Mr.
Reagan's.
C. Recommendations
Assuming the continuation of present policies and goals in both the
United States and the United Kingdom, it is submitted that legal and
administrative changes could be made which would further assist in the
achievement of these objectives. The following are some suggestions.
1. United States
a Coastal revenue sharing
The American oil industry supports coastal revenue sharing because
it believes that such a legislative provision would reduce the opposition of
coastal states to OCS leasing. But the federal government, afraid of the
1052. OFFSHoRE, July 20, 1984, at 6.
1053. See supra notes 792-94 and accompanying text.
1054. Uthlaut, supra note 1045, at 10.
1055. North Sea Oil and All That, an address by J.M. Raisman, Chairman and Chief Executive of
Shell U.K. Limited, to the Energy Industries Club, in London (Apr. 17, 1984).
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effect on Treasury receipts, has so far been opposed to increased state
revenue sharing.10 56 It may be possible, however, to use coastal revenue
sharing to increase both the rate of leasing and federal revenues. It was
noted above that areawide leasing has greatly swollen bonus monies re-
ceived by the MMS. 1057 The largest rewards have accrued from the Gulf
of Mexico, because more tracts have been offered in that mature oil prov-
ince than elsewhere. This has been due to the fact that there has been
considerable opposition to offshore leasing in the Pacific, Atlantic, and
Alaskan regions. But industry remains interested in these areas. If area-
wide lease sales could be held, for example, in the Californian and North
Atlantic OCS as easily as they are arranged in the Gulf, then a large
influx of bonuses would also be forthcoming from frontier territories.
Were coastal states to be granted, for instance, a ten percent share in
lease bonuses, then the states would have a direct interest in the rate of
leasing. The strongest incentives to cooperate with the federal program
would be provided to those states with the most lucrative adjacent OCS.
These states, California, Alaska, and the New England states, have to
date been DOI's most intransigent opponents. Such a scheme would
have the added attraction of providing a rapid cash flow to both the
states and the federal Treasury. There is reason to believe that such a
coastal revenue sharing concept would indeed facilitate a reduction in
coastal opposition to federal offshore activities. The record of California
is instructive. Though California has been a staunch opponent of OCS
leasing, it has permitted the drilling of more than 3000 wells in its own
state waters.10 58 By comparison, only 2000 wells had been drilled on the
UKCS as of 1982.1059
If the coastal states were persuaded by this proposition, then the
federal government would almost certainly stand to make an overall gain
in revenues from the OCS. But if the states failed to respond, then the
result would be a net loss in revenues because there would be nothing to
offset the ten percent loss in Gulf of Mexico bonuses. Despite the latter
possibility, it is submitted that it would be worthwhile experimenting
with such a plan for a trial period of, perhaps, eighteen months.
1056. See Vass I, supra note 992, at 86-87.
1057. See supra note 1026 and accompanying text.
1058. OCS Oversight-Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Panama Canal/Outer Conti-
nental Shelf ofthe House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1981)
(testimony of Secretary James G. Watt).
1059. SCOTTISH DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, supra note 587, at 5.
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b. Enlargement of OCS tracts
Apart from litigation and moratoria, a major obstacle to the
achievement of the administration's expedited leasing policies has been
the size of OCS tracts. The rapid development of the North Sea and the
present exploratory boom is largely attributable to the British Depart-
ment of Energy's policy of offering and licensing vast amounts of acre-
age. In the seventh round, for example, about five million acres or fifty
percent of the area offered was licenced. 1°6° Areawide leasing has also
offered large parts of the federal offshore to the oil industry. But in the
first fourteen months of the new system only 6.4% was actually
leased." 6 British blocks are more than ten times as large as American
tracts, and Norwegian blocks are about twenty times larger.10 62 As the
MMS readily admits, "a single tract will rarely be commercially produci-
ble ... by itself." 0 63 It is therefore proposed that future OCS tracts
should be generally expanded to four times their present size. A multi-
plication of four allows previous grid lines to continue in use. It should
be noted that this expansion would not necessarily involve a change in
the law, as such an action is within the Secretary of the Interior's discre-
tion, as laid down by section 8(b)(1) of the OCSLAA.' 064 If the future
norm favored larger OCS tracts, however, a change in the statute might
be desirable.
It is suggested that the consequences of such an innovation would be
as follows. Areawide leasing has shown that if massive amounts of qual-
ity offshore acreage are put on the market, then industry is prepared to
invest a great deal of money in cash bonuses, and many more tracts will
be leased, albeit at a lower dollar amount per acre. 06 5 But because com-
petitive bidding directs industry funds to the most lucrative tracts, only a
certain number of tracts can be leased. Assuming the continuation of a
substantially similar system of areawide leasing, the introduction of
forty-square mile tracts would not necessarily diminish the number of
tracts sought by the oil corporations. There would still be the same
1060. U. K. DEP'T oF ENERGY, supra note 534, at 32.
1061. MuIERALS MGMT. SERvicE, supra note 980, at 71.
1062. Daintith & Gault, supra note 581, at 31.
1063. MnIERALS MGMT. SERVICE, supra note 980, at 73.
1064. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1982).
1065. The National Ocean Industries Association asserts that bonuses for OCS leases have been
dropping since 1980. Factors which have caused this, apart from the large increase in the availabil-
ity of lease acreage, are lower anticipated future world prices, higher development costs, and a reduc-
tion in the quality of Gulf of Mexico near-shore offerings. See National Ocean Industries
Association, An Industry Perspective on the First Year of the OCS Areawide Leasing Program in
the Gulf of Mexico (Sept. 11, 1984) (draft report).
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number of companies desiring to participate in OCS exploration and de-
velopment. They might form larger consortia and so submit fewer bids,
but since they would not be obligated to expand their exploration pro-
grams commensurate with the increase in acreage, there is no reason why
this should happen. Money available for bidding would certainly not in-
crease with the size of the tracts, and there would inevitably be a further
drop in the dollar amount paid per acre.
The benefits of such a tract expansion would be threefold in nature.
First, it has been the shortage of acreage in frontier areas which has been
a leading cause of the rather disappointing exploration rates. Yet it is the
frontier areas which are likely to contain the largest oil and gas accumu-
lations. Thus larger tracts would significantly increase industry holdings
and hence probably lead to a higher rate of exploration. Second, while
forty-square mile tracts would not cause a quadrupling of the pace of
OCS exploration, they would facilitate a more thorough offshore invento-
rying, which is one of DOI's declared goals. Third, the proposed tracts
would tend to be more economically viable.
Circumstances could arise, however, where it might be difficult or
inappropriate to utilise the envisaged larger tracts. In much of the Gulf
of Mexico, for instance, it would be impossible, because of extensive ear-
lier leasing, to lease many squares of the aforementioned size. The solu-
tion there would be to continue to use the previous system. The larger
delimitations might also be inappropriate where it becomes obvious that
a great deal of prime acreage is concentrated in one or two tracts. The
Santa Maria Basin in California, which has been made an industry target
because of the Point Arguello discovery, could be cited as a case in
point.1066 The retention of smaller tracts would serve to widen participa-
tion in such lucrative acreage.
It is submitted that the adoption of forty-square mile tracts would
not be susceptible to successful litigious attack. Areawide environmental
analysis and areawide leasing have both been judicially approved, 1067 and
it would be easy to assimilate the larger tracts into the streamlined leas-
ing process. Not even tract evaluation would need to be changed, as the
minimum bid of $150 per acre could simply be retained along with the
other procedures. Secretary Watt's concept of fair market value, with its
lowered proportional cash bonuses and its anticipated raising of royalties
and taxes, was held in Watt II to meet the requirements of the OC-
1066. See Oil and Gas in Washington, WoRLD OIL, Feb. 1, 1984, at 23.
1067. See California v. Watt, 712 F.2d 584, 590-94 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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SLAA. °6 s This leasing proposal, which embodies the former Secretary's
rationale, would, it is believed, meet with similar approval. While it
might be thought that a fourfold increase in tract acreage is ambitious,
compared to the British experience such a tract would be regarded as
small. In any event, in order to further allay criticisms relating to the
enlarged tract size, a British-style surrender requirement of perhaps a
third to a half of the acreage after the initial term could be
introduced. 10 69
c. Sequential bidding
The total number of bonus bids in any given lease sale accurately
reflects industry interest in certain offered tracts. On tracts perceived as
especially attractive multiple bids will be submitted. Since areawide leas-
ing expanded the lease market, a much higher percentage of tracts have
been awarded on a single bid basis.1 70 Nevertheless, a significant
number of cash bonuses are still being returned to unsuccessful bidders.
Industry lease acreage, OCS participation, and federal receipts would to
some extent be increased if such bidders were allowed to reinvest their
committed finance in alternative tracts. It cannot be guaranteed that all
or any of the rejected bonuses would actually be used in fresh bidding,
because areas eliciting no initial submissions will have been viewed unfa-
vorably. However, it is highly likely that some new bidding would be the
result of this sequential system.
Sequential bidding would make lease sales somewhat more complex,
as there would in fact be two or even more "rounds." It is projected that
costs, however, would be more than offset by increased bonuses.10 71 Six
to eight months could be left to elapse between the announcement of
initial awards and the timing of a second round of bidding. This inter-
lude would give industry some time to undertake additional geophysical
and geological work. The strategies of successful bidders in the first
round would also be of assistance to second round bidders. 1072
1068. Id. at 606-08.
1069. See Petroleum (Production) Regulations, 1982 STAT. INST. No. 1000, sched. 5, cl. 4.
1070. OUTER CONTNENTAL SHELF RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT N-ws, Sept. 1983.
1071. See McDonald, The Economics of Alternative Leasing Systems on the Outer Continental
Shelf, 18 Hous. L. REv. 967, 981 (1981).
1072. The United States Department of Energy did consider promulgating regulations which
authorised sequential bidding in the autumn of 1979. But no such regulations were actually passed.
See OCS Oversight-Part 2, supra note 1058, at 12.
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d. Enhanced oil recovery
Presently, it is impossible to economically produce most of the oil
and gas in hydrocarbon reservoirs. The average recovery rate in the
North Sea, at fifty percent, is high by world standards.' 73 In 1981, the
United States Geological Survey estimated that the United States con-
tained up to 250 billion barrels of oil that could not be economically
produced.1074 If even ten percent of that total could be made available,
the American oil supply situation would be transformed. But up until
now, oil companies have preferred to concentrate their funds on new ex-
ploration and development.
It is clear that enhanced oil recovery (EOR) offers immense poten-
tial for the future. But the new technologies necessary to markedly in-
crease production from existing fields are likely to prove very expensive.
In an attempt to mitigate this expense, various fiscal incentives designed
to encourage EOR are currently built into the federal oil tax system.
Under the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980,1075 for instance,
incremental tertiary oil is categorized as tier three oil.'0 76 Revenues ac-
cruing from the sale of tier three oil are chargeable at the low rate of
thirty percent.10 77 The other two tiers of taxable oil, tiers one and two,
are generally chargeable at the rates of seventy and sixty percent respec-
tively.10 78 A further mitigative measure could be implemented by offset-
ting all or part of EOR expenditures against federal royalties.
The British government has also considered ways of encouraging
EOR. It was announced in the 1984 budget that, following consultation
with industry, there would be a review of the tax position of EOR activi-
ties on the UKCS. °79 Consequently, it was expected that the resulting
changes would be announced in the 1985 budget. Ultimately, however,
no concessions were made to the oil industry on this issue.
1073. Address by J.M. Raisman, supra note 1055.
1074. AM. PET. INST., Two ENERGY FuTuRas: A NATIONAL CHOICE FOR THE 1980's, at 43
(1980).
1075. Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (1980) (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 4986-4998 (1982)).
1076. See 26 U.S.C. § 4993(c) (1982).
1077. Id. § 4987(b)(3). See generally Bell & MacKenzie, Windfall Profit Tax and DOE Regula-
tion: Problems in Property Definition, 32 INsT. OIL & GAs L. & TAX'N 301, 322 (1981) (discussing
the tertiary recovery of crude oil).
1078. 26 U.S.C. § 4987(b)(1) (1982).
1079. Inland Revenue, Press Release (Mar. 13, 1984).
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2. United Kingdom
a. An auction experiment
Because the cash bonus system used in American competitive leas-
ing does not discourage further development, areawide sales have re-
sulted in a major monetary influx for the American Treasury without
significantly damaging industry's capacity to develop discoveries. The
British system has also been successful in raising revenues, but it is awk-
ward by comparison. In American terms, acreage on the UKCS is ob-
tained, in conjunction with other discretionary criteria, by an exploration
bid, with royalties and taxes constituting the other elements in the gov-
ernment's economic rent. During the years 1980-83, excessively high
levels of taxation all but destroyed industry's incentive to develop. The
British exploration bid, which is different from the OCSLAA version,
has not entailed wasteful drilling, because United Kingdom operators do
not have to compensate the government for shortfalls between actual and
projected exploration. Though failure to carry out a work programme
can prejudice an oil company with respect to future licensing rounds, this
effect would be minimised if it could be shown that exploration would be
fruitless anyway. It is not proposed that the work programme system be
completely abolished. The government has great confidence in it, and it
has functioned well in practice.
Accordingly, it is suggested that the United Kingdom should retain
the work programme system, but begin large-scale experimentation with
competitive bonus bidding. If auctioning could be used to partly switch
UKCS revenues away from taxation, then offshore development would
be further encouraged. United Kingdom governments have historically
been wary of cash bonuses, largely because of the anticipated effect on
British participation, a notion reflected by the fact that the total sum of
UKCS auction and nomination receipts is less at today's exchange rates
than the highest ever single OCS bid.1080 Nevertheless, it is submitted
that an auction experiment could be devised which would greatly en-
courage frontier development, speed Exchequer cash flow, and do much
to guarantee British participation.
The auction experiment could be performed in the following fash-
ion. In the next round of licensing, the British government should, as
they did in the seventh round, offer both a substantial number of speci-
fied discretionary blocks and open up a vast UKCS area to industry nom-
1080. OCS Oversight-Part 2, supra note 1058, at 52.
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ination. The nominations zone should only consist of frontier territory.
The discretionary blocks would be licenced in the normal fashion and
would therefore ensure the success of the round whatever the results of
the auction experiment. It would be announced in the Gazette notice
that, pursuant to a certain deadline, bonus bids would be invited with
respect to blocks in the nominations area. All bids would have to allow
for any relevant BNOC oil trading rights and twenty percent British par-
ticipation. A minimum bid per block could be fixed at ten million
pounds. This bid would be similar to OCS minimum rates, but would
double the nominating fee sought in 1980.081 It would be further pro-
vided that the PRT chargeable against discoveries in auction areas
(which could be referred to as "auction fields") would be reduced by five
percent from future rates applicable at the date of first production with
every £400 million submitted in total bonuses. Also, a twenty percent
ceiling would be put on possible tax reductions.
This proposal would utilise the best of both the competitive and the
discretionary systems. The nominations procedure, a successful feature
of the OCS system and the seventh British round, would elicit corporate
expertise to licence prime acreage. This latter factor, along with possible
tax relief, would constitute a strong incentive to bid. There has as yet
been no recent British "licence sale," held under favorable conditions,
which could give guidance to the amounts of bonus money which the
British oil industry would be willing to invest. It may be helpful in this
respect to compare the UKCS against the Gulf of Mexico. The former is
by most yardsticks a more lucrative oil province than the latter; in 1983,
the UKCS produced about twice as much oil as the Gulf.1082 Given that
the second areawide lease sale in the Louisianian OCS provided the fed-
eral Treasury with about $3.5 billion'083 and given the fact that many oil
companies operating on the UKCS are American subsidiaries and hence
have some access to international financing, one might reasonably hope
that an areawide auction of British blocks would attract at least one-third
to one-half as much as the second areawide lease sale. A successful auc-
tion would constitute a considerable boost to the Exchequer, which, it
will be recalled, gained only £548 million on the sale of Britoil.108 4 De-
pending on bidding levels and on how many oil and gas accumulations
are left to be discovered in frontier areas, the auction might actually
1081. See supra note 783 and accompanying text.
1082. Offshore Production makes significant gains, OFFSHORE, May 1984, at 110, 113.
1083. 1IERALS MGMT. SERVICE, supra note 549, at 9.
1084. See supra notes 867-72 and accompanying text.
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cause overall oil revenues to increase. The British participation proviso
would be unlikely to attract opposition from the oil industry, as the re-
quirement would be insignificant when compared to the sixth round con-
dition that BNOC had to be offered more than a fifty-one percent equity
share in every licence application. Difficulties might arise, however, with
regard to the laws of the EEC, of which Britain is a member state. EEC
rules forbid the creation by one member state of trade laws which dis-
criminate against other member states.""85 A twenty percent British par-
ticipation requirement might well be interpreted as discriminatory. A
solution to this possible problem would be to change the proviso so as to
require twenty-five percent EEC participation. Since almost all of the
non-British UKCS operations have been undertaken by North American
companies, a twenty-five percent EEC proviso would in practice ensure
at least twenty percent British involvement in each licence.1
0 86
b. BNOC's oil trading role
BNOC's marketing division has been seen by the Conservatives as a
vital guarantor of Britain's oil supply. It is also clear that private oil
companies resent this state activity and believe that BNOC is unsuited to
its designated task in times of market uncertainty. Regardless of the
changes that may eventually be introduced into the realm of state oil
trading, it is almost certain that emergency powers will be retained. It is
equally probable that BNOC will remain as the instrument of control.
Despite these likely conditions, it may still be possible to facilitate more
market-oriented oil trading under normal conditions. In particular it is
suggested that the government should, with the agreement of the oil in-
dustry, divest BNOC of its current fifty-one percent purchase options.
Criteria for future licensing rounds should reflect this change. The state
oil corporation's trading role should be reduced to fifteen percent,
thereby keeping it active and in tune with the market, but alleviating its
former dominant position. Under ordinary conditions this reduction
would not matter greatly, as the policy of successive British governments
and BNOC has generally been to let the world oil market determine
BNOC's offering price. 08 7 In place of BNOC's former powers, it should
1085. Woodeliffe, North Sea Oil and Gas--The European Community Connection, 12 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. 7, 14 (1975). For a further discussion on the interaction between United Kingdom oil
and gas law and EEC law, see Evans, The Development of a Community Policy on Oil, 17 COMMON
Mr. L. REv. 371 (1980); Evans, United Kingdom North Sea Oil Policy and EEC Law, 7 EUR. L.
REv. 355 (1982).
1086. See K. DAM, supra note 542, at 40.
1087. Forster & Zillman, supra note 600, at 81.
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be statutorily stipulated that in every future contract for UKCS oil or
condensate there will be an implied term allowing the British govern-
ment the right, in times of emergency, to purchase up to sixty percent of
production at fair value. Although decisions as to what constitutes an
"emergency" and "fair value" would be matters of ministerial discretion,
post-crisis arbitration would be allowed with respect to the latter. As-
suming the continuation of the present legal requirement that all UKCS
oil and gas must first be landed in the United Kingdom before being
exported, it is submitted that BNOC's reduced role and the new implied
term would be adequate to protect British interests.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the United States, the Republican administration of Ronald Rea-
gan has pursued the goals of decreased foreign dependence and oil-fired
economic regeneration with an ambitious expedited leasing program. In
the past, only comparatively tiny parts of the OCS were leased. In ac-
cordance with the American economic ethos, the development of OCS
riches was solely entrusted to private enterprise, which used a competi-
tive bidding system with cash bonuses as the sole bid variable. The Rea-
gan administration's new streamlined procedures have channeled
significant industry input into the leasing process, as the new areawide
system has greatly increased industry lease holdings. But because of liti-
gation and appropriations moratoria, most of the new lease holdings
have occurred in the Gulf of Mexico and, to a lesser extent, in Alaska.
There has also been a considerable quickening of the pace of exploration,
but again this has been concentrated in the Gulf. The approach of the
new Secretaries of the Interior, William Clark and Donald Hodel, has
been to continue, albeit less ambitiously, the basic policies of the Watt
program. The opposition of coastal states and environmentalists, accom-
panying litigation, and appropriations moratoria seriously threaten the
viability of the present five-year program. The American institutional
and political structure and the complex laws relating to OCS oil and gas
do much to facilitate challenges to federal offshore decision-making. The
OCS holds great potential, especially in the Alaskan frontier areas, but at
the present it makes only a limited contribution to the American econ-
omy and oil supply. Because of the long lead times essential to offshore
oil exploration and production, it is not yet possible to conclude whether
the OCS program will actually result in a massive increase in domestic
production. Thus far, however, the expedited leasing policies have been
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moderately successful in at least creating opportunities for exploration in
prospective waters.
Britain's economic situation, her production relative to consump-
tion, and her position vis-a-vis the oil industry have required the Con-
servative government, although philosophically similar to its American
ally, to adopt a somewhat different oil policy. In the context of Britain's
declining heavy industries and the recession of 1979-82, it became neces-
sary for the British government to attempt to maximise UKCS oil reve-
nues. The oil crisis of 1979-80 served to reiterate the need for strong
governmental controls over oil supply, and effectively guaranteed
BNOC's future as the leading North Sea oil trader. UKCS overproduc-
tion prompted the Department of Energy to consider depletion controls,
and the fact that North Sea development inevitably involves substantial
foreign participation caused the Conservatives to continue the discretion-
ary allocation licensing system. Conservative policy throughout, how-
ever, has been geared to the maximisation of exploration and
privatisation. These goals have manifested themselves in three massive
licensing rounds and the termination of BNOC's and BGC's operating
roles in the oil business. In more recent times, desires to prolong self-
sufficiency have resulted in a slackening of the tax burden, at least with
respect to "future fields," and the encouragement of new production.
British oil policy has by now become similar to the policies pursued in
America. The Conservatives' market-oriented stance has entailed some
experimentation with the corporate nomination procedures and bonus
bidding, two dominant features of the Watt program. But no experiment
has yet established the true potential for bonus bidding in licensing
rounds. In the event that an experiment with bonus bidding proves suc-
cessful, the tax burden of offshore operators may be reduced to the mu-
tual benefit of both government and industry.
The large Tory majorities in the last two elections, the lack of public
interest in offshore oil and gas, and the structure of United Kingdom oil
and gas law have combined to ensure that there has been no effective
opposition to government energy policy. As a result, the British govern-
ment's goals are being successfully achieved. The UKCS has had an
enormous impact on the British economy and has provided a balance of
payments surplus, billions of pounds in Treasury receipts, and hundreds
of thousands of jobs. Impressively higher rates of exploration have been
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Author's Note: Since the writing of this essay, the Thatcher administra-
tion has taken significant steps in meeting its policy of privatisation. The
government's remaining forty-nine percent share in Britoil will be sold
off to the private sector in mid-1986.10 8 The shares will be priced at
185p each and should generate eight to ten billion pounds.108 9 The gov-
ernment plans to retain its special share.' The sale of these state assets
should play a vital part in the current administration's plan to cut per-
sonal taxes before the next general election.
Perhaps the most significant act of denationalisation has been the
decision to abolish the BNOC. BNOC's marketing difficulties have re-
surfaced with the recent decline in the price of oil. Up until March 1985,
the Department of Energy favored the retention of BNOC because of its
alleged capacity for adding a measure of short-term stability to the oil
market. 0 91 Specifically, BNOC can set price rates which are fixed for
months at a time. Unfortunately, most oil is now sold in short-term spot
markets instead of pursuant to term contracts. Thus the present continu-
ing decline in the price of oil and the currently available supply of cheap
oil in the spot market effectively undercuts BNOC's term prices. BNOC
can now barely sell one-fifth of its one million barrels of participation oil
per day at officially set prices."' 92 As a result, most of BNOC's oil is
currently sold at a loss on the spot market. By January 1985, national-
ised oil trading was costing the taxpayer one million pounds per day. 0 93
Early in March of 1985, the House of Commons Select Committee
on Energy strongly criticised BNOC's role in the market. Shortly there-
after Secretary of Energy Walker made an announcement before the
House of Commons and stated that "BNOC could avoid the risk of
losses only by linking its prices for participation oil closely and continu-
ously to movement in the spot market.""' 4 But to do this would mean
that it would no longer be possible for BNOC to contribute even short-
term stability to oil prices. Hence, reasoned the Secretary, the BNOC
should be abolished. The Oil and Pipelines Bill, 10 95 currently before Par-
liament, purports to do just that. If enacted, the Bill would provide for a
1088. One Burnt, Twice as Generous, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 3, 1985, at 69, 69.
1089. Id.
1090. Id. at 70.
1091. U. K. DEP'T oF ENERGY, supra note 906, at 82.
1092. See Grease the oil price slide, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 5, 1982, at 11, 11.
1093. Id.
1094. See U. K. DEP'T oF ENERGY, supra note 906, at 82.
1095. H.C. Bill 165, 1984-85 Sess. (1985).
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new statutory body, the Oil and Pipelines Agency.' 96 This agency
would be charged with disposing of selected assets of the BNOC.' 97 Af-
ter BNOC had been abolished, the Oil and Pipelines Agency would as-
sume responsibility for three main functions. First, it would undertake
the marketing of government royalty oil.198 Presumably, price fixing for
royalty oil would be related to prices on the spot market. The Agency
would also be provided with powers to guarantee the security of supply
for the United Kingdom.109 9 BNOC's participation agreements would
not be revoked even though the Agency would normally trade participa-
tion oil. The Secretary of Energy would continue to retain his power to
activate these agreements in an emergency."' Should such a happening
occur, the Agency would market the participation oil. 1101 Finally, the
Agency would be charged with acting as the Department of Energy's
agent with regards to the government's oil pipeline system.' 10 2
It should also be briefly noted that current American leasing and
exploratory work continues at a brisk pace. In 1984, the DOI leased
7,304,655 OCS acres,'1 O an increase of nearly one million acres over the
1983 total."' Leases were awarded for over two million acres in the
Alaskan OCS, five million acres in the Gulf of Mexico, and approxi-
mately fifty thousand acres in the Pacific OCS. 11°5 No leases were
awarded in the Atlantic OCS. In comparison to the 383 exploratory
wells drilled in 1983, 627 exploratory wells were drilled in the OCS dur-
ing 1984.1106 This dramatic increase was mainly due to the exploratory
boom in the Central and Western Gulf of Mexico, as deepwater Gulf
activity in particular experienced a rapid expansion. Seventy-one explor-
atory wells in depths of water over 600 feet-three times the total
number of exploratory wells drilled in such depths prior to 1983-were
drilled in the Gulf in 1984.1107 The Alaskan OCS has also been the locus
of increased exploration as eleven exploratory wells-eight more than in
1096. Id. at cl. 1.
1097. Id. at cl. 4(1).
1098. See U. K. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 906, at 82.
1099. H.C. Bill 165, cl. 2.
1100. See U. K. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 906, at 82.
1101. H.C. Bill 165, cls. 2(1)(a), (b); (2)(a).
1102. See U. K. DE'T OF ENERGY, supra note 906, at 82.
1103. MINERALs MGMT. SERViCE, U.S. Dm"T OF INTERIOR, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL
AND GAS LEASING PROGRAM, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1984, at 2 (1985).
1104. Leases were awarded for 6,587,879 OCS acres in 1983. MINERALs MoMT. SERVCE, supra
note 549, at 16.
1105. MINERALs MGmT. SERVICE, supra note 1103, at 2.
1106. Id. at 11.
1107. Id. at 13.
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1983-were started in 1984.1108 In the first commercial find in the Alas-
kan OCS, Shell Western discovered commercial quantities of oil in OCS
tracts adjacent to the Seal Island area, which is located in Alaskan state
waters.' 9 Exploratory work in the Pacific OCS remained at about the
same level, although many of the thirty-two wells begun in 1984 were
drilled to further appraise discoveries made in the Santa Maria basin.""
In keeping with the general dearth of activity in the Atlantic OCS, only
three wells were drilled in that region during 1984.1111
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